6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
727.
The SPG
advised on 30 September that:
•
A coercive
strategy, “Force on Mind”, was “the key instrument of
military
power”
during a conflict prevention phase.
•
Overt
preparations for the use of military force were strategic elements
of
that
strategy.
•
The
northern option was seen as strategically fundamental by the UK
but
was not
seen as operationally fundamental by CENTCOM.
•
More
clarification was needed of the likely tasks for UK land forces
and
planning
was still constrained by uncertainties about Turkey.
•
The UN
route and the timetable for inspections might not be
compatible
with the US
timetable for the pursuit of regime change, which might
pose
a potential
fault line between the US and UK.
728.
A further
version of the SPG paper ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’
was
produced on
30 September.291
729.
The paper
stated that Ministerial statements highlighted a twin track
approach to
achieving
the UK’s “End State” for Iraq:
•
Achieving a
“significant change” in the “behaviour and posture” of the
current
regime,
“with respect to WMD, and other UNSCRs, to prevent
conflict”.
•
If the
regime failed “to change its behaviour voluntarily”, then it would
“be
compelled to
change its posture through the
application of force”. If that
resulted in
regime change it would be “an unsought, but added
benefit”.
730.
That was
underpinned by a revised section on the principles for the
campaign,
which
stated that the UK was “executing a strategic Force
on Mind campaign”
in which
influence
was “targeted against decision makers and their will to fight”.
During a conflict
prevention
phase, that was “the key instrument of military
power”:
•
The crisis
had reached the point where “constant coercive pressure”
was
“needed to
keep up forward momentum”.
•
“Overt
Force Generation and Force Preparation activities” were
“strategic
elements”
in applying pressure.
•
A “clear
and unified declaration of intent” from “a wide and solid
coalition” would
deliver the
most powerful message to Saddam Hussein.
291
Paper
[SPG], 30 September 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on
Iraq’.
283