The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
would
marginalise UK influence and risk presentational problems, but was
not settled US
policy. The
UK was lobbying in Washington and Baghdad to amend the draft
regulation.
466.
Mr Jon
Cunliffe, Treasury Managing Director for Macroeconomic Policy
and
International
Finance, advised Mr Brown the following day that resolution
1483 made
the US and
UK jointly responsible, as Occupying Powers, for governing Iraq
including,
specifically,
for disbursements from the DFI.257
The
resolution changed the basis
on which
the UK engaged with the US, but the current framework for making
and
implementing
decisions did not reflect that. As far as economic and financial
policy was
concerned,
it was “a mess” because:
•
It was not
clear what decisions Ambassador Bremer could take without
approval
from
Washington.
•
Ambassador
Bremer reported to Secretary Rumsfeld; there was no
clear
framework
in Washington for involving other US departments.
•
The UK had
no clear involvement in decision-making; what UK-US
consultation
there was
tended to be between No.10 and the White House.
467.
Mr Cunliffe
suggested that this mattered because:
•
The UK had
responsibility without power. If money was wasted on a large
scale,
or there
was an economic policy failure, or the CPA acted in a way that
cut
across its
mandate under resolution 1483, the UK would be
accountable.
•
The
Treasury had no way to ensure that the right economic and financial
policies
for Iraq
were pursued. Attempts to give the IMF and World Bank a direct role
in
the use of
the DFI had failed.
468.
Mr Cunliffe
reported that he had raised his concerns at the AHMGIR
meeting
the
previous day; Mr Straw and Baroness Amos had been sympathetic.
Mr Cunliffe
understood
that No.10 was considering proposing a joint White House/No.10
group,
to which
the CPA would report.
469.
On 9 June, Ms
Cathy Adams from the Legal Secretariat to the Law Officers
sent
a reply to
a letter of 21 May from FCO Legal Advisers seeking advice on
resolution
1483.258
The advice
relating to the formation of a representative government is
described
in Section
9.2.
470.
Ms Adams
advised that the resolution clarified the legitimate scope of
activity of
the
Occupying Powers and authorised them to undertake actions for the
reform and
reconstruction
of Iraq going beyond the limitations of Geneva Convention IV and
the
Hague
Regulations. In some cases, such actions had to be carried out in
co-ordination
257
Minute
Cunliffe to Chancellor, 6 June 2003, ‘Iraq
Reconstruction’.
258
Letter
Adams to Llewellyn, 9 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Effect of Security Council
Resolution 1483 on the
Authority
of the Occupying Powers’.
84