6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
500.
Lt Gen Reith
put forward two options:
•
“National
focus with limited operational exposure.” The Base Plan,
involving
“operations
within the AO as presently defined, concentrating on
making
the early
transition from Phase III to Phase IV, with an end state defined
as
‘exemplary
performance’ in Phase IV within Basra region”. One advantage
of
the Base
Plan was that it preserved UK combat power “for the major Phase
IV
task in the
AO (Basra, for example is a city of 1.5m people and may not
be
a
benign environment)”.
•
“Coalition
focus with unconstrained operational exposure.” This
approach
reflected a
number of contingency plans (CONPLANS) in different stages
of
development
and involved “selective deployment of UK formations where
their
capabilities
are most efficiently used, consistent with the requirement to
service
the Basra
AO”. Among the disadvantages of this approach was a reduction
in
the number
of troops available for Phase IV operations in the UK AO,
which
“may impact
on our ability to produce exemplary early effect during Phase
IV”.
501.
Lt Gen Reith
concluded:
“US
commanders are likely to press on branch planning and UK land
contributions
beyond the
provisions of the Base Plan.
“The
situation is changing: the potential for a UK Box remains my
aspiration but is
in
practical terms receding …
“In
discussing the campaign, and subject to their [the Chiefs of Staff]
agreement,
CJO [Chief
of Joint Operations, Lt Gen Reith] will balance the desire to
husband our
land forces
for Phase IV in our own AO, against the possible Coalition
requirement
to take a
greater part of the Phase III effort, with the risks this implies
in terms of the
ease with
which we transition to Phase IV.”
502.
The Chiefs of
Staff discussed the papers on 5 March.168
They rejected
the proposal
for a UK
box.
503.
In Lt Gen
Reith’s absence, Maj Gen Fry sought guidance from the Chiefs of
Staff
on offering
“UK ‘niche’ contributions beyond the provisions of the Base Plan”
in the
context of
the requirement to deliver an exemplary Phase IV.
504.
The Chiefs of
Staff noted that until the arrival of US 4th Infantry Division,
the
UK would be
providing “a disproportionately high percentage of the combat
power
in the
South and that it would disadvantage the Coalition campaign to
ring-fence UK
land forces
in a national boundary”. A more flexible approach would be needed
and a
“balance
had to be struck between achieving closure to Phase III and the
delivery of
an
‘exemplar’ Phase IV”.
168
Minutes, 5
March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
463