The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
restoration
of full control of government to the Iraqis themselves … The US
also
envisage
the establishment of ORHA ‘regional offices’ in the
provinces.”
651.
Mr Straw
advised that “whatever its shortcomings, ORHA will be the
essential
element in
the ability of the Coalition to carry its military successes into
the post-conflict
phase”.
652.
Sir David
Manning advised Mr Blair that the UK should take
responsibility for
ORHA’s
regional office in the area for which the UK military had
responsibility.
653.
Mr Blair
took the view that the UK should take a regional lead in
ORHA,
unless a
scoping study determined that was impossible.
654.
On 16 April,
the AHMGIR, chaired in Mr Straw’s absence by
Mr Hoon,
commissioned
advice on whether the UK should lead one of ORHA’s regional
offices.373
655.
In response,
Mr Drummond chaired a meeting of officials, after which he
sent
Sir David
Manning an IPU paper recommending that the UK defer making a
commitment
until a
scoping study had been carried out to determine the practical
implications
656.
The IPU paper
reported that the US had not yet decided on the number of
ORHA
regional
offices. One possibility was a four region structure consisting of
Baghdad,
northern
and eastern border provinces, central Iraq and southern
Iraq.
657.
The UK
remained concerned that US policy in Iraq would not be consistent
with the
UK’s
understanding of the rights and responsibilities of an Occupying
Power. If a UK-led
ORHA region
included within it areas occupied by US forces, the UK would have
legal
responsibility
for their actions but no practical way to control
them.
658.
The IPU
advised that the UK therefore needed to decide whether in
principle
it wanted
to lead a regional office covering a region coterminous with that
in which
1 (UK) Div
was responsible for maintaining security. If Ministers wanted to
pursue that
option, a
number of fundamental questions needed urgent answers, including
how the
UK-led
regional office would relate to UK forces.
659.
Sir David
Manning advised Mr Blair:
“I think
you will have to give firm direction. My own view is that we should
accept
the risks
and lead a regional office to cover area for which we have
military
373
Minutes, 16
April 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
374
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Support for ORHA
Regional Office’ attaching
Paper IPU,
16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA Regional Offices’.
375
Manuscript
comment Manning to Prime Minister on Minute Drummond to Manning, 16
April 2003,
‘Iraq: Support
for ORHA Regional Office’.
116