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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
restoration of full control of government to the Iraqis themselves … The US also
envisage the establishment of ORHA ‘regional offices’ in the provinces.”
651.  Mr Straw advised that “whatever its shortcomings, ORHA will be the essential
element in the ability of the Coalition to carry its military successes into the post-conflict
phase”.
652.  Sir David Manning advised Mr Blair that the UK should take responsibility for
ORHA’s regional office in the area for which the UK military had responsibility.
653.  Mr Blair took the view that the UK should take a regional lead in ORHA,
unless a scoping study determined that was impossible.
654.  On 16 April, the AHMGIR, chaired in Mr Straw’s absence by Mr Hoon,
commissioned advice on whether the UK should lead one of ORHA’s regional offices.373
655.  In response, Mr Drummond chaired a meeting of officials, after which he sent
Sir David Manning an IPU paper recommending that the UK defer making a commitment
until a scoping study had been carried out to determine the practical implications
(see Section 10.1).374
656.  The IPU paper reported that the US had not yet decided on the number of ORHA
regional offices. One possibility was a four region structure consisting of Baghdad,
northern and eastern border provinces, central Iraq and southern Iraq.
657.  The UK remained concerned that US policy in Iraq would not be consistent with the
UK’s understanding of the rights and responsibilities of an Occupying Power. If a UK-led
ORHA region included within it areas occupied by US forces, the UK would have legal
responsibility for their actions but no practical way to control them.
658.  The IPU advised that the UK therefore needed to decide whether in principle
it wanted to lead a regional office covering a region coterminous with that in which
1 (UK) Div was responsible for maintaining security. If Ministers wanted to pursue that
option, a number of fundamental questions needed urgent answers, including how the
UK-led regional office would relate to UK forces.
659.  Sir David Manning advised Mr Blair:
“I think you will have to give firm direction. My own view is that we should accept
the risks and lead a regional office to cover area for which we have military
responsibility.” 375
373  Minutes, 16 April 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
374  Minute Drummond to Manning, 16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Support for ORHA Regional Office’ attaching
Paper IPU, 16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA Regional Offices’.
375  Manuscript comment Manning to Prime Minister on Minute Drummond to Manning, 16 April 2003,
‘Iraq: Support for ORHA Regional Office’.
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