The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
72.
Resolution
1153 (1998), adopted on 20 February 1998, increased the amount
of oil
Iraq could
sell from US$2bn every six months to US$5.2bn. The resolution
requested the
establishment
of a group of experts to determine, with the Government of Iraq,
“whether
Iraq is
able to export petroleum or petroleum products sufficient to
produce” the funds
identified
in the resolution as necessary to meet Iraq’s
needs.20
They
reported in April
that it
could not, leading to authorisation of the import of oil industry
spare parts and
equipment
in resolution 1175 (1998) on 19 June.
73.
Resolution
1153 also recorded the UN Secretary-General’s observation
that
the
situation in the electricity sector in Iraq was extremely grave. It
asked him, in
consultation
with the Government of Iraq, to submit a report on essential
humanitarian
needs,
“including necessary improvements to infrastructure”.
74.
As a result of
Iraq’s decision to suspend co-operation with UNSCOM and
the
IAEA and
resolution 1194 condemning Iraq’s decision, the six-monthly UN
reviews
of
sanctions were suspended. As an incentive, Iraq was offered the
prospect of a
comprehensive
review of Iraqi compliance if co-operation was resumed. Iraq
declined.
75.
The
Oil-for-Food programme continued to operate, with resolutions
renewing the
arrangements
every six months, until 2003. It helped to alleviate the
humanitarian
position in
Iraq, but there was concern, within the UN and elsewhere, about the
impact
of
sanctions. As well as the humanitarian impact, there were reports
of increased
corruption
in Iraq, misuse of Oil-for-Food, and increased oil smuggling which
was
benefiting
Saddam Hussein’s regime. These concerns led to questions about
the
sustainability
of the policy, which are addressed in Section 1.2.
76.
There had been
a Royal Navy (RN) presence in the Gulf region since the
early
1980s, when
the Armilla patrol was deployed to defend UK vessels caught in
the
crossfire
of the Iran-Iraq War. After the 1991 Gulf Conflict, a RN frigate or
destroyer was
permanently
deployed in the Gulf as part of a US-led naval force to support the
UN arms
embargo and
controls on the export of oil through the Gulf. It had powers to
intercept
ships
suspected of breaching UN resolutions.
77.
Concerns about
the risk of Saddam Hussein attacking neighbouring
countries,
particularly
Kuwait, remained. Mr Simon Webb, MOD Policy Director from July
2001 to
October
2004, told the Inquiry that the deterrent effect of aircraft
enforcing the NFZ in
southern
Iraq was a “side benefit of risk reduction”: it was an alternative
to stationing
significant
ground forces in Kuwait because it enabled the US and UK to know
what
the
military situation was in Iraq. If an Iraqi military build-up was
detected it would
20
UN Security
Council resolution 1153 (1998).
38