The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The “main
body” of 7 Armoured Brigade personnel was expected to arrive
in
Kuwait
between 25 February and 10 March. An initial capability of two
armoured
battlegroups
would be complete in theatre by 3 March, with the “vast
majority”
of their
equipment in place by 9 March. They would have full operating
capability
by 20
March.
•
Deployment
of aircraft had “only just begun”.
459.
The MOD wrote
that “the precise timing of the commencement of the
land
campaign”
had not been finalised. Land operations were expected to begin in
“the first
few days”
of the campaign.
460.
While the
overall US plan remained as briefed to Mr Blair, its details
might
“yet
develop in important ways”. Much of that revolved around timings;
if the current
uncertainty
over the deployment of US land forces through Turkey was not
resolved,
it could
“require changes to the plan in the South to compensate for
lack
of
‘Northern effects’”.
461.
The latest “in
a succession of US deadlines for Turkish agreement” on land
forces
was 22
February, “after which (they say) they would send their 4th
Infantry Division
south”.
462.
The US was
“looking at a number of variations on the current
plan”.
If implemented,
those might give UK forces “(particularly 7 Armoured Brigade) a
more
substantial
role than under the current plan”. The MOD stated:
“No
commitment to any changed plan will be given to the US, even in
principle,
without
Ministerial approval.”
463.
The MOD wrote
that Saddam Hussein remained focused on averting a US
attack
and it was
only once he had determined that was “unavoidable and imminent”
that he
would
consider pre-emptive options. Saddam Hussein currently had the
capability to
pre-emptively:
“•
Militarily
re-occupy the Kurdish Autonomous Zone within 72 hours.
A humanitarian
crisis would result.
•
Mount a
limited CBW strike on Coalition Forces/civil populace of Kuwait. In
the
very worst
case this could be effected within hours of a decision to do
so.
•
Mount a
limited CBW strike on regional neighbours (most likely Israel).
Again in
the very
worst case this could happen within hours of a
decision.”
464.
The MOD’s
ability to provide “unambiguous intelligence” warning of those
events
would be
minimal.
465.
The MOD was
content that the current draft of campaign objectives
offered
“a coherent
basis for UK participation” but recognised that a legal basis for
the use
of force
was needed before the objectives could come into effect. It also
required
458