9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
303.
The CIG
assessed that intensive fighting in Fallujah would trigger a surge
in
violence
elsewhere in Sunni Arab areas, although the scale of such activity
would
depend on
what happened in Fallujah. If the attack was short and precise
the
consequent
violence was expected to be limited; long drawn out fighting with
heavy
civilian
casualties was expected to provoke a more intense
reaction.
304.
Mr Blair’s
Private Secretary briefed him on 2 November that Prime Minister
Allawi
was
concerned about aspects of the military plan.157
He added
that “planning for the
post-conflict
phase remains inadequate, and the US now seem resigned to
this”.
Iraq was a
significant theme of the US Presidential election campaign in
autumn 2004.
One US poll
conducted at the start of the campaign indicated that Iraq was the
most
important
issue to 17 percent of US voters, behind the economy (25 percent)
and the war
on terror
(24 percent).158
According
to Mr Bob Woodward,
although
the level of violence in Iraq remained high
throughout
the campaign and surged in the weeks leading up to election day,
the
absence of
a strategy for Iraq and the mounting violence “never quite grabbed
hold in
the
campaign”.159
Mr Woodward
also reported the views of Mr Blackwill, who had been
struck by
the lack of time to discuss Iraq policy during the campaign and
President Bush’s
“round-the
clock, all-consuming focus on winning the election”. According to
Mr Blackwill,
the
President “talked about goals, expressed his optimism … and gave
pep talks”, but the
administration
had “no real strategy”.
President
Bush was elected for a second term in office on 2 November
2004.
Secretary
Powell announced his resignation from government in November 2004.
He
was
succeeded as Secretary of State by Dr Rice, who in turn was
replaced as National
Security
Advisor by her deputy, Mr Stephen Hadley.
305.
On 3 November,
the JIC assessed the political prospects for the
forthcoming
elections.160
As well as
assessing that a strong Sunni Arab turnout would be
essential
for
credibility and that the forthcoming events in Fallujah would be
critical in determining
how things
would unfold, it considered the likely impact of a delay. The JIC
judged that:
“A limited
delay to the elections – of a month or so – would have little
impact on the
political
process. A longer delay will undermine Allawi’s credibility and
that of the
coalition,
and would be likely to lead to increased violence, including from
the Shia.”
306.
That judgement
was based, in part, on the position of Grand Ayatollah
al-Sistani.
He had
recently issued a statement encouraging all Iraqi citizens to
register to vote and
was “the
only significant Iraqi voice to emphasise the need for
representation in the TNA
157
Minute
Quarrey to Prime Minister, 2 November 2004,
‘Fallujah’.
158
Time,
3 September
2004, Campaign
2004: Bush Opens Double-Digit Lead.
159
Woodward
B. State of
Denial. Simon &
Schuster UK Ltd, 2006.
160
JIC
Assessment, 3 November 2004, ‘Iraq Politics: From Here to the
Elections’.
445