9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
243.
Gen Walker
chaired an internal MOD meeting on 19 October to
discuss
Lt Gen Fry’s
paper.123
He
underlined the need to consider the request in terms
of
military advantage
and to have a good understanding of the likelihood of success
in
Fallujah
within the 30 day time period.
244.
Air Chief
Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, Chief of the Air Staff, noted that “the
key
question in
relation to military benefit was whether the UK contribution in
North Babil
would
increase the chance of success in Fallujah. If this was the case,
then a clear logic
chain
existed in support of the UK deployment.” Both Lt Gen McColl and
Maj Gen Rollo
saw
military benefit in the deployment.
245.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under Secretary, considered that the
Black
Watch could
help prevent insurgents spreading out from Fallujah but “there
would be
a casualty
issue”.
246.
At the end of
the meeting, Gen Walker commissioned the DIS to
prepare
a one‑page
threat assessment for North Babil compared with MND(SE),
including
a casualty
assessment.
247.
Mr Blair’s
Private Secretary provided him with a Cabinet Office brief on the
pros
and cons
for the different timing options of a decision.124
It
highlighted that an early
decision
would mean that UK troops (the Black Watch) could be in place in
good time,
but that it
would mean extending their tour of duty. A delayed decision would
mean
that the
next troop rotation would have arrived (the Scots Guards) and could
backfill
the Black
Watch as the MND(SE) armoured reserve. But delay might also lead
the US
to conclude
that the UK would always turn down such deployment
requests.
248.
In his
covering note, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary told Mr Blair that he
would get
“firm
advice” later in the week, but that Gen Walker and Mr Hoon would
discuss options
with him
the next day. Gen Walker was reported to favour limiting any offer
of support to
30 days, to
discourage early deployment.
249.
Anticipating a
positive decision on the North Babil deployment, Mr Ian Lee,
MOD
Director
General Media and Communications, wrote to Mr Martin Howard, MOD
Director
General
Operational Policy, with some thoughts about announcing it. Mr Lee
observed
that
“journalists find it hard to believe that the US military
machine needs this
UK help,
and this in
turn leads them to the conclusion that (US) politics is driving the
issue”.125
250.
The Defence
Intelligence Staff (DIS) reported on 20 October that there had
been
no MNF-I
fatalities in the previous month within the area the US was
proposing UK
forces
should deploy to, but that they could “expect a hostile local
population”, and might
123
Minutes, 19
October 2004, ‘Record of Discussion – CDS O’ Group – 19 Oct
04’.
124
Minute
Quarrey to Blair, 19 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Possible Troop
Redeployment’ attaching ‘Iraq: UK
Deployment
to North Babil’.
125
Minute Lee
to DG Op Pol, 19 October 2004, ‘Troop Movements in
Iraq’.
435