9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
444.
From 2005,
Iraq would enter a Normalisation Phase, when the Strategy
assumed
the UK’s
objective would have been met, iraq would be largely
self-supporting and
Coalition
Forces (apart from trainers) would have been
withdrawn.
445.
Analysis of
the conditions in Iraq acknowledged both that the UK did “not
wish
to remain
Occupying Power of Iraq for any longer than is necessary” and that
“our
influence
over US policy is limited”.
446.
The following
risks were identified:
•
The pace of
political and reconstruction progress could fall.
•
The
resistance of forces opposing the Coalition could escalate
significantly.
•
Oil
production could continue to lag.
•
Iran and
Turkey could increase their interference.
•
Coalition
support for the Occupation could collapse in the event of
sustained
high
casualty levels.
447.
The Strategy
identified the highest threat as being a sustained
insurgency,
including
frequent terrorist attacks. It also identified the “worst case
scenario” as
major
Islamist terrorist groups, especially non-Iraqis, beginning to
drive the opposition,
as they
would have no interest in engaging in the political process. The
paper identified
possible
solutions:
“More
security forces, particularly local. Greater intelligence
collection and
co‑ordination,
particularly in order to facilitate counter-terrorist
operations.
Greater
co‑operation with and pressure on neighbours to secure borders.
Security
package for
UN to allow it to resume work.”
448.
The Defence
and Overseas Policy Committee (DOP) met on 9 October, chaired
by
Mr Blair.257
This was
the first meeting of DOP in 2003 and the first to discuss Iraq
since
1999. A
background note on Iraq, a paper on political process by the IPU
and a paper on
the Madrid
Conference were tabled.
449.
The meeting
began with an assessment of the security situation.
Mr Scarlett
reported
that while attacks on the Coalition were rising, 80 percent of them
were
taking
place in the “Sunni triangle”. Disillusioned Sunnis, who did not
see a future for
themselves
in the new Iraq, were the principal source of concern.
450.
Lt Gen Fry
reported that the security situation in southern Iraq was very
different
from that
in the Sunni triangle. He argued that the Shia were largely
co-operative and
the British
approach to making balanced progress on governance, the economy
and
security
was paying dividends.
257
Minutes, 9
October 2003, DOP meeting.
281