The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
158.
Mr Blair
gave an extended interview about Iraq and public
services
on BBC Television’s
Newsnight
on 6
February.39
159.
During the
interview Mr Jeremy Paxman challenged Mr Blair on a
number
of issues,
including:
•
whether
Iraq posed a clear and imminent danger to the UK or was a
potential
future
threat;
•
what had
changed since Mr Blair had stated in November 2000 that
Saddam
Hussein was
being effectively contained;
•
that the
inspectors had not been “thrown out” of Iraq in 1998, but had
withdrawn;
•
whether, if
the inspectors were present in Iraq, it would be “impossible
for
Saddam
Hussein to continue developing weapons of mass
destruction”;
•
what
evidence there was of Iraqi concealment;
•
how much
time and space the inspectors needed to do their job;
•
whether
Mr Blair would “give an undertaking” that he would “seek
another
UN resolution
specifically authorising the use of force”;
•
the absence
of links between Baghdad and Al Qaida; and
•
why action
against Iraq was the priority, not other states with
WMD.
160.
The key
elements of Mr Blair’s responses to Mr Paxman and related
questions
from a
panel of voters are set out below.
161.
Explaining his
position on a second resolution, Mr Blair stated that “the
only
circumstances
in which we would agree to use force” would be with a further
resolution
“except for
one caveat”. That was:
“If the
inspectors do report that they can’t do their work properly because
Iraq is not
co-operating
there’s no doubt that under the terms of the existing United
Nations
resolution
that that’s a breach of the resolution. In those circumstances
there should
be a
further resolution.
“… If a
country unreasonably in those circumstances put down a veto then I
would
consider
action outside of that.”
162.
Pressed
whether he considered he was “absolutely free to defy the express
will
of the
Security Council”, Mr Blair responded that he could not “just
do it with America”,
there would
have to be “a majority in the Security Council”:
“[The]
issue of a veto doesn’t even arise unless you get a majority in the
Security
Council.
Secondly, the choice … is … If the will of the UN is the thing that
is
most
important and I agree that it is, if there is a breach of
resolution 1441… and
we do nothing
then we have flouted the will of the UN.”
39
BBC
News, 6
February 2003, Transcript
of Blair’s Iraq Interview.
206