The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
845.
Al Jazeera
journalists were present inside Fallujah, and images of the US
offensive
were
broadcast across Iraq and the world. Lt Gen Sanchez wrote in his
memoir:
“To say
that the Fallujah offensive angered the Sunni Muslims of Iraq would
be a
gross
understatement … When the images of destruction were broadcast
on
Al Jazeera,
most Sunnis felt Fallujah was an attack on their very existence
…
When tribal
leaders put out a call to arms, Sunnis everywhere responded and
the
Sunni
Triangle exploded into violence.”468
846.
Sir David
Richmond told the Inquiry that he had been “very concerned”
because:
“What the
Americans were doing in Fallujah which was being broadcast all
over
the Arab
media was causing serious problems all round, certainly the Sunni
part
of Iraq but
also … the Shia part of Iraq. It was clear to me this had to stop
if we
weren’t
going to face very, very serious problems. I was in constant
contact with
London
throughout the period and made very clear my views about that. I
spoke to
Bremer and
made clear what my views were about that … I think ultimately
Bremer
came down
on the same side as me and told the military that they had to
rethink
847.
General Sir
John McColl, SBMR-I from April to October 2004, told the
Inquiry:
“There was
a debate within headquarters as to how we should proceed, a
debate
which I
shared with London, and there were those within the American camp
who
wanted to
move early and seize the initiative, which involved the early use
of kinetic
force, and
those who wanted to move more slowly. Certainly, in terms of my
advice
at the
time, it was to move cautiously, to try and ensure that, as far as
we could, we
carried the
politics with us and prepared the political conditions to support
whatever
military
activity took place.”470
848.
General
Sanchez wrote in his memoir that:
“… the
British three-star general [McColl] on the CJTF-7 consistently
voiced his
Government’s
concerns about our planned offensive and I’m certain that
lively
discussions
took place between the White House and 10 Downing Street.
London
believed
that we were being far too heavy-handed, but President Bush still
gave the
849.
Ambassador
Bremer described Mr Brahimi as so deeply concerned by
the
bloodshed
that he had “threatened to quit Iraq”.472
In
response, Ambassador Bremer
468
Sanchez RS
& Phillips DT. Wiser in
Battle: A Soldier’s Story. HarperCollins,
2008.
469
Public
hearing, 26 January 2011, pages 20-22.
470
Public
hearing, 8 February 2010, pages 11-12.
471
Sanchez RS
& Phillips DT. Wiser in
Battle: A Soldier’s Story. HarperCollins,
2008.
472
Bremer LP
III & McConnell M. My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.
Threshold,
2006.
344