The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
they were
not valued on return and did not get enough assistance
finding
a new position.
728.
Mr Howard
undertook to write to PJHQ about those issues.
729.
The Inquiry
has not seen any further material addressing those
issues.
730.
Participants
at the civilian outreach event described the setting up of
the
S2O programme
as a significant turning point for the MOD, rectifying problems
with
the
previous system under which there had been no centralised unit for
managing
MOD civilian
deployments.
731.
Those deployed
during the CPA period characterised training and the
issuing
of personal
security equipment as ad hoc, with practice varying between
departments.
Several
mentioned that military body armour was too big and heavy for
people not used
to it, and
compared it unfavourably with the lighter armour issued to the
media and some
US
civilians.
732.
Participants
who served in Iraq between 2004 and 2007 described
pre‑posting
arrangements
as ad hoc and haphazard. The MOD was felt to have performed
better
than the
FCO, particularly after the creation of S2O in 2006. FCO
participants were
particularly
critical of FCO workforce planning, including line managers’
responsibility
for recruiting
their own staff, which did not work well when they were in
theatre.
733.
Participants
at the outreach event who had been in Iraq between 2007 and
2009
saw no
consistency in the pre‑deployment preparation offered by different
departments,
but
commented that there had been improvements to the security course
at Chilwell.
734.
Living
conditions for personnel seconded to ORHA in April and May 2003
were
difficult.
Maj Gen Cross told the Inquiry:
“The
reality was the living conditions [for ORHA personnel] were pretty
atrocious,
and
although somebody like myself who had done a number of operations
was
relatively
comfortable, for a lot of people just surviving was pretty hard
work.” 470
735.
As early as
June 2003, concerns emerged that civilian personnel deployed to
Iraq
were not
prepared for the conditions they would encounter.
736.
A DFID
contractor seconded to CPA(South) asked the DFID Iraq Directorate
to
inform new
consultants of the conditions in Basra, in particular the
challenges of the
working
environment, climate and conditions.471
One
consultant had serious health
issues and
no medical insurance.
737.
The PJHQ
recruitment notice for civilian postings to Iraq published in July
2005
stated that
applicants would need to be “fit and healthy, often to a higher
standard than
470
Public
hearing, 7 December 2009, page 50.
471
Email [DFID
contractor] to DFID [junior official], 14 June 2003, ‘Secondments
to CPA S’.
368