The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
171.
Mr Ingram
subsequently met Mr Baker and other MOD officials to discuss
work
already in
hand to improve the BOI process.103
Mr Ingram’s
Private Secretary recorded
that
Mr Ingram:
“...
postulated that there might be a need to consider a more radical
approach;
that rather
than working to make the current system work better, we might
need
to consider
adopting a different system.”
172.
Mr Baker
said that he had already discussed the possibility of a more
radical
approach
with the Services, and concluded that “there was no realistic
alternative to
the BOI
process”. The MOD needed a thorough process of examination in order
to
learn
lessons, and needed to be able to ensure that it could be
undertaken quickly and
address all
the relevant issues. Mr Baker advised that the arguments for
continuing with
the BOI
process would be set out in a submission.
173.
An MOD
official working in Mr Baker’s Directorate sent
Mr Ingram’s Private Office
advice on
the “rationale for continuing with the BOI process” on 2
March.104
174.
The official
identified three alternative mechanisms for establishing the
facts
surrounding
an incident – Learning Accounts, Service Police investigations, and
inquests
– and
concluded that none of them met the MOD’s
requirements.
175.
The official
concluded that the current BOI system played a “valuable role”
in
“establishing
the full details of the circumstances surrounding an incident and
in learning
the lessons
to prevent a recurrence”. Particular advantages were:
•
BOIs
enabled the MOD to fulfil its duty of care and health and safety
obligations
towards its
employees.
•
Investigations
into sensitive matters could be carried out “within the
Service
environment
and by the relevant subject matter experts”.
•
As BOIs did
not seek to apportion blame, and evidence given to a BOI could
not
be used in
a Service court, witnesses might be more candid than in another
type
of
investigation.
•
BOIs were
“tried and tested and worked well”.
The
official also described the work under way to improve the BOI
process.
176.
The BOI report
into the loss of Nimrod XV230 in September 2006 (in
Afghanistan)
was
published on 4 December 2007. Mr Browne told the House of
Commons on the
same
day:
“By its
nature, the Board was not in a position to go into the history of
those
arrangements
[for assessing the airworthiness of Nimrod aircraft] or to
assess
where
responsibility lies for failures ... Flying will never be
risk‑free. But I do believe
103
Minute
Johnson to DG SP Pol, 22 February 2007, ‘Boards of
Inquiry’.
104
MOD [junior
official] to PS/Minister(AF) [MOD], 2 March 2007, ‘Boards of
Inquiry (BOIs)’.
108