11.2 |
Conclusions: De‑Ba’athification
sectarianism
was legitimised in Iraqi political culture, helping to create an
unstable
foundation
for future Iraqi governments.
23.
Although it is
difficult to arrive at a precise figure, the evidence suggests that
the
impact of
de‑Ba’athification was felt by tens of thousands of rank and file
Ba’athists.
De‑Ba’athification
continued to be identified as a major Sunni grievance and a
source
of sustenance
for the insurgency in Iraq as late as 2007.
24.
As described
in Sections 9.6 and 9.7, UK influence in Iraq and its relationship
with
the Iraqi
Government declined further from 2007. From that point, lacking
influence,
there was
very little realistic prospect of a UK‑inspired change in the
approach to
de‑Ba’athification.
25.
The Inquiry
concludes that early decisions on the form of de‑Ba’athification
and
its
implementation had a significant and lasting negative impact on
Iraq. This negative
impact was
soon recognised by the UK Government, but its efforts to secure a
change
of approach
were largely ineffective. This became a persistent problem that
could
be traced
back to both the early failure to have a settled US/UK agreement on
how
the big
issues of post‑war Iraqi reconstruction would be handled and the
improvised
decision‑making
leading up to Order No.1.
26.
After the fall
of a repressive regime, steps inevitably have to be taken to
prevent
those
closely identified with that regime from continuing to hold
positions of influence
in public
life. The development of plans which minimise undesired
consequences,
which are
administered with justice and which are based on a robust
understanding
of the
social context in which they will be implemented, should be an
essential part
of
preparation for any post‑conflict phase. This should include
measures designed to
address
concerns within the wider population, including those of the
victims of the old
regime, and
to promote reconciliation.
27.
It is vital to
define carefully the scope of such measures. Bringing too many or
too
few
individuals within scope of measures like de‑Ba’athification can
have far‑reaching
consequences
for public sector capacity and for the restoration of public trust
in the
institutions
of government.
28.
It is also
important to think through the administrative implications of the
measures
to be
applied and the process for their implementation.
29.
The potential
for abuse means that it is essential to have thought‑through
forms
of oversight
that are as impartial and non‑partisan as possible.
30.
For lessons
related to the UK’s involvement in decision‑making within the
CPA,
see Section
9.8.
61