The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
774.
The Government
dossier, Iraq’s Weapons
of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of
the British
Government, was published
on 24 September.427
775.
Mr Blair’s
statement to the House of Commons, the questions that followed, and
the
subsequent
debates on Iraq in both Houses of Parliament, are addressed in
Section 3.5.
776.
In relation to
Iraq’s WMD capabilities and intent, Mr Blair’s statement drew
on the
dossier,
including Mr Blair’s Foreword, the material sent to No.10 by
the FCO on 2 and
4 September,
and subsequent briefing material produced for the
debate.
777.
Mr Rycroft
sent a framework for the statement to Mr Blair, together
with
background
material, on 20 September.428
778.
The framework
comprised six sections:
•
Introduction
•
The
threat
•
The
response
•
Tackling
head-on some of the difficult questions to pre-empt
questions
•
Consultation
with Parliament; and
•
Conclusion.
779.
In relation to
the threat, Mr Rycroft suggested:
“Summarise
the dossier: main focus WMD, but also material on the
nature
of Saddam’s
regime. History of the inspectors and UNSCRs …”
780.
In the section
on the response to the threat, Mr Rycroft set out the
framework
of the
UN route and that Iraq should comply with all the UN’s demands; and
that
Saddam Hussein
had:
“… a long
history of claiming to offer unconditional access, but then
attaching
conditions
…
“For
instance, the Iraqi Foreign Minister told the UN last week that
Iraq is ‘clear of all
nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons’. That is a lie. The dossier
explains why.”
781.
Addressing the
question “Why now?”, Mr Rycroft wrote:
“Dossier
sets out the threat. It is increasing every year, especially with
Saddam’s
illicit
money. Would be unconscionable to be aware of the threat and do
nothing.”
427
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002.
428
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Tuesday’s
debate’.
264