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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
develop a plan for submission to the Council within 45 days “calling for the
destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate” of all items listed
in OP12;
carry out that plan within 45 days of the Council’s approval; and
develop a plan for future monitoring and verification for the approval of the
Security Council “within one hundred and twenty days”.
120.  The Special Commission provided for in OP9 subsequently became known as
the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), and was a subsidiary organ of the
Security Council, reporting to it through the UN Secretary-General. The Council asked
the Director General of UNSCOM to carry out inspections, and to develop plans for the
future monitoring and verification of both nuclear and other prohibited weapons systems
and programmes. Mr Rolf Ekéus, a Swedish diplomat who had been the Ambassador to
the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva from 1978 to 1983 and had been involved
in international negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Control and
Verification of the Biological Weapons Convention, was appointed Executive Chairman
of UNSCOM on 15 April 1991 and began work on 24 April.
Iraq’s response to resolution 687
121.  Iraq’s initial declarations in response to resolution 687 were incomplete and it failed
to co-operate with inspections and concealed activities.
122.  In resolution 687, the UN originally expected a three-step inspection process:
full disclosure by Iraq;
verification of those disclosures by the Commission; and
destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision,
of all proscribed weapons, materials and facilities.46
123.  UNSCOM’s approach was to establish a “material balance”, for each of the
weapons categories, between items acquired by Iraq through import or production and
their disposal by use or destruction.47
124.  Iraq provided initial declarations of its holdings of prohibited weapons on
18 and 28 April 1991.48
125.  The Butler Review was told that the JIC pre-conflict estimate that Iraq’s stockpile
of chemical agent was between 6,000 and10,000 tonnes was “derived from past
46  UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated 25 January 1999 from the Executive Chairman of the Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (S/1999/94), paragraph 3.
47  UN Security Council, 11 April 1996, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of resolution 687 (1991)’
(S/1996/258).
48  UN Security Council resolution 707 (1991).
46
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