6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
(see Section 3.7)
were “helpful”. Looking beyond the current divisions in the
international
community,
it would be “important to seek unity of purpose through the
humanitarian and
reconstruction
work which would follow any military action”. Planning in this
field “needed
to take
centre stage”. He would pursue that with President Bush “in the
coming days”.
The
“transitional civil administration in Iraq should have a United
Nations mandate,
although
the scale of United Nations involvement should balance the
administrative
effectiveness
with the necessity for proper authority”.
657.
In his
diaries, Mr Campbell wrote:
“At
Cabinet, things were pretty much rock solid … I could sense a few
of them only
fully
realising … the enormity of the decisions, the enormity of the
responsibility
involved …
Clare [Short] was doing her usual … and for her was relatively
onside.
She wanted
to do a big number on aftermath preparations but TB was there
ahead
of her. He
was very calm, matter of fact, just went through where we were on
all the
main
aspects of this.”285
658.
Mr Straw
sought advice from Mr Wood on the legal authority for
post-conflict
reconstruction.
659.
Mr Wood
set out the legal constraints on an Occupying Power. He stated
that
the longer
an occupation lasted and the further the tasks undertaken
departed
from the
objective of the military intervention, the more difficult it would
become
to justify
an occupation in legal terms.
660.
On 10
March, Mr Wood told the Attorney General’s Office that the UK
view
of the
legal framework for occupation appeared to be getting through to
the US.
661.
Mr Straw’s
Private Office requested advice from Mr Wood on Ms
Short’s
observation
in Cabinet that there appeared to be no legal authority for
post-conflict
reconstruction:
“Is this
true? The Foreign Secretary thinks that it is. If so, it underlines
the
importance
of having effective UN authority in place very quickly (the
so-called
third resolution).
The Foreign Secretary knows that officials are already in
touch
with DFID
about this but would like this work to be given even higher
priority.”286
285
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
286
Minute
McDonald to Wood, 27 February 2003, ‘Iraq
Post-Conflict’.
427