The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
234.
In his
diaries, Mr Campbell provided more detail of the discussion. The
points
recorded by
Mr Campbell included:
•
Mr Blunkett
had said “he didn’t feel there was much support [for where
policy
on Iraq
was going]”.
•
Several
Cabinet members thought the “real concern” was the Middle East
Peace
Process.
•
Mr Charles
Clarke, Minister without Portfolio and Chairman of the Labour
Party,
said the
Labour Party “would support provided the case was real and
properly
made”. In
his view, judgement of the UK would rest on success or failure.
People
“understood”
Mr Blair’s “position of support in exchange for
influence”.
•
Mr Blunkett
also “raised the international and legal basis for action”.
Support
for
[military intervention in] Kosovo and Afghanistan had been
“pretty
overwhelming”,
but “a military assault on Iraq would carry less weight. It
would
depend on
the role of the UN.”
•
Mr Cook
described Saddam Hussein as “a psychopath” and stated that
there
was “a fine
balance” to strike on military action. Saddam would not listen
to
Mr Annan
unless he believed “there might be military action”. Mr Cook
wasn’t
convinced
that the [military] action [in December 1998] “had been
productive”.
He “doubted
whether it would be worth taking action” if Saddam was
“still
standing at
the end”, and Saddam would be “much cleverer than the
Taliban”.
The best
way of isolating Saddam would be progress on the MEPP. Mr
Cook
also warned
against allowing the UK to become isolated in Europe.
•
Mr Blair
had said “people’s concern’s were justified. ‘I do want to assure
you that
the
management has not gone crazy.’ What are the dangers? US
unilateralism.
Bush doing
it for the wrong reasons. Lack of progress on the Middle East.
Taking
action
which proves to be ineffective.” The UK had to “try to influence
and shape
US
strategy. But we have to try to put ourselves in the right
position. Get the
weapons
inspectors back in … the only thing Saddam responds to was real
fear.
If we had
regime change it would make a huge difference to the whole
region.”
235.
Lord Wilson
told the Inquiry that it was the most important Cabinet discussion
of
Iraq he had
attended in 2002.80
It had
lasted an hour and he had taken “seven and a bit
pages of
notes … and Iraq occupied six and a bit pages”. Lord Wilson
commented that
that was
not bad “as a full discussion without papers”. He had gone “away
feeling pretty
pleased. I
thought ‘In my time as Cabinet Secretary I have seen the Cabinet
begin to
play its
role as I think the Cabinet should play its role.’”
“… raised
all sorts of issues, not political issues particularly, issues
about the legal
position,
about … what would be involved in military action, whether you
could
80
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, pages 72-73.
428