6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
763.
Dr Cholerton
recommended that Mr Hoon should delegate target
clearance
authority
to AM Burridge:
•
For
Category A individuals in a military location with potentially HIGH
numbers
of civilian
casualties […] or in a non-military location with potentially
MEDIUM
numbers of
civilian casualties […].
•
For
Category B individuals in a military location with potentially
MEDIUM
numbers of
civilian casualties or in a non-military location with potentially
LOW
numbers of
civilian casualties […].
764.
That
delegation was on condition that Mr Hoon was “informed as soon as
possible
of the
planned attack” and, if at all possible, before it took
place.
765.
The names of
the individuals listed under either category would be
provided separately.
766.
Dr Cholerton
recommended, where targets were “outside the above
casualty
ceilings”
or were located at a “special location”, that Mr Hoon delegated
unlimited
authority
to AM Burridge. That was subject to the condition that Mr Hoon
“must
be
informed”
of his decision to attack in advance, and that the attack could
only take
place after
AM Burridge had received confirmation that Mr Hoon had not
overruled
his decision.
767.
In deciding
whether or not to overrule AM Burridge’s decision, Mr Hoon would
be
provided
with details about the target’s identity, location and an estimate
on the number
of civilian
casualties.
768.
If Mr Hoon was
content, that approach would be set out in an annex to the
CDS
Directive
and AM Burridge would not be able to delegate those
responsibilities further.
769.
Mr Hoon wrote
to Lord Goldsmith on 29 March, setting out the
approach
recommended
by Dr Cholerton.266
On whether
the named individuals were legitimate
targets, Mr
Hoon wrote:
“I have
satisfied myself that the individuals we were considering who are
not formally
members of
the Iraqi Armed Forces are taking a direct part in hostilities by
their senior
functions
in the Iraqi military command structure. Each of them is therefore
in principle
a
legitimate target who may, subject to the proportionality test, be
lawfully attacked.”
770.
An Annex was
attached to the letter setting out the two categories of
individuals.
Category A
was entitled “dramatic” and comprised Saddam, Qusay and Uday
Hussain.
Category B
was entitled “significant” and listed four senior members of the
Iraqi Armed
Forces.
266
Letter Hoon
to Goldsmith, 29 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Targeting Individuals’
attaching Paper ‘Iraq:
Personalities’.
509