The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
483.
Although the
media were reporting disagreements between the UK and US
about
what the
UK’s force posture should be in MND(SE), that was not the reality;
discussions
with both
the US and Iraqi governments were continuing. The UK was
currently
conducting
an assessment of the impact of Op SINBAD, after which the UK would
take
a decision
on what needed to be done in the future.
484.
On security in
Basra, Mr Browne stated:
“… the
murder rate had reduced from over 100 to less than 30 a month,
which
compared
favourably with a number of European States and American cities.
The
kidnap rate
had been halved and polling suggested levels of confidence in
security
which would
be welcome in the UK; 90 percent of those polled felt more secure
than
a year ago;
only 2 percent had encountered intimidation in the last six
months.”
485.
The
restoration of marshland by the military, DFID and the Iraqi
Government had
been
described as “the most significant and successful restoration of
the environment
and
lifestyle in the history of the world”.
486.
On 25 January,
Mr Asquith reported a series of discussions he and Lt Gen
Lamb
had held
with Gen Casey and Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno,
Commander
Multi‑National
Corps – Iraq, over the preceding 48 hours about transition plans
for
Basra.261
He reported
that they thought:
•
As Iraq’s
second city, Basra had a key role to play in the country’s
regeneration.
It could
not afford to become (pre‑ or post‑PIC) “another al‑Amara” in
which
Western
contractors could not operate, thereby making
redevelopment
impossible.
The situation post‑PIC needed to parallel that of Dhi Qar or
Najaf,
where the
PRT could operate effectively with reasonable security
protection.
•
In addition
to reconstruction work, there would still be a need for police
training
post‑PIC.
Gen Casey had recently observed problems in al‑Amara, where
the
MNF were
unable to visit police stations in the centre of town, requiring
the IPS
to visit
MNF on the city perimeter. He ascribed this to the UK’s
re‑posturing in
September
2006 which meant the withdrawal from all bases in the
city.
•
A key
benchmark for PIC was that the threat from armed groups should be
low
and
expected to remain so following PIC. The US view was that neither
Maysan
nor Basra
had yet passed that test.
•
Although
both Generals had received several briefings on the UK plans as
they
evolved,
neither had yet seen a fully worked through set of options. That
was
clearly
essential.
487.
Mr Asquith
commented that it would be necessary for UK plans to demonstrate
that
it would be
possible for MNF to move around the city (including post‑PIC) along
the lines
of Dhi Qar.
It would also be important for the plans credibly to demonstrate
that the UK
261
eGram
3125/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 25 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Basra:
Handling the US’.
90