3.7 | Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

312. UNMOVIC had moved more quickly to establish the inspection process than

originally envisaged. It had begun work on 27 November 2002, almost a month earlier

than the deadline of 23 December in resolution 1441. It had also been able to establish

the Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Centre (BOMVIC) and

a temporary centre at Mosul more quickly than the 60 days it thought would be needed

before entering Iraq.

313. Most of the site visits conducted during the first six weeks were “intended [to]

familiarise inspectors with the sites, and inspection techniques”. In addition, inspectors

checked the equipment which had been tagged by UNSCOM, examined remote

cameras and asked about work carried out at sites since 1998. Some visits had been

superficial. From early January, “the inspections had become longer and more intrusive”.

314. Initially UNMOVIC had been hampered by a lack of support equipment, personnel

and experience. It had taken UNMOVIC until mid-December to get to near full strength

with 100 inspectors. The inspectors were on short contracts with “a consequent loss of

expertise” and “few” had experience of operating in Iraq.

315. UNMOVIC had acknowledged the problems. By the beginning of February, it

had “visited or inspected all but one of the UK’s recommended sites”, and continued

to be receptive to UK advice on potential targets. “Fatigue” was, however, “becoming

a significant factor” which had been “reflected in an increasing number of accidents”

during inspections. Fatigue was the result of:

“… a combination of the pace of the inspection programme; Iraqi pressure; the

perceived need for a ‘success’; and concern for personal safety in the event of war.”

316. During January and early February, “a total of 22 biological associated scientists

and missile experts refused to meet inspectors in private”. The three scientists who had

agreed to interviews were “selected by the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate”. Even

if Baghdad did concede interviews, all the scientists would be “concerned that anything

they say will become known to the Iraqi authorities”.

317. Finds had included:

• “nuclear-related documents hidden at the home of […] an Iraqi scientist” on

16 January, although “the general perception has been that these do not

constitute a ‘smoking gun’”;

• “CW associated rocket warheads at Ukhaider ammunition depot” the same

day. The liquid in one warhead was “awaiting the delivery of chemical sampling

equipment”. That had arrived but was “not yet operational”;

• a “small quantity of … CW precursor chemicals at a Laboratory”;

• “aluminium nozzles for 80mm rockets that Iraq had recast, but not declared”

were discovered by the IAEA on 31 January; and

• “parts” from a “suspected … biological or chemical sub-munition” were found

“at the al-Numan factory”.

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