4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
the
language in the dossier) was one to which such considerations
should
have applied.
•
The
judgement reached by the JIC in this case should have been able to
depend
on
detailed, expert analysis of the intelligence.
•
In the
event, the JIC had no reason to know that that had not
happened.
•
It was
understandable that SIS should have wanted to give greater than
normal
protection
to the human intelligence source on this occasion.
•
But a
problem arose because it was kept from the relevant DIS analysts
who
had a wider
perspective.360
•
It would
have been more appropriate for senior managers in the DIS and SIS
to
have made
arrangements for the intelligence to be shown to DIS experts
rather
than their
making their own judgements on its significance.
•
The fact
that it was not shown to them resulted in a stronger assessment in
the
dossier in
relation to Iraqi chemical weapons production than was justified by
the
available
intelligence.
•
It also
deprived SIS of key expertise that would have helped them to assess
the
reliability
of their new source.
•
We have not
been presented with any evidence that persuades us
that there
was an
insuperable obstacle to allowing expert-level DIS access
to
671.
The Butler
Report stated:
“We
accept the need for careful handling of human intelligence reports
to
sustain the
security of sources … We accept
that this report was from a new
source who
was thought to be of great potential value and was therefore of
extreme
sensitivity.
Nevertheless, it was
wrong that a report which was of significance
in the
drafting of a document of the importance of the dossier was not
shown
to key
experts in the DIS who could have commented on the validity
and
credibility of
the report.”362
672.
The Butler
Report added:
“…
arrangements should always be sought to ensure that the need for
protection of
sources
should not prevent the exposure of reports on technical matters to
the most
expert
available analysis.”363
360
The Inquiry
infers that that is a reference to wider knowledge of chemical and
biological weapons
programmes.
361
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraphs
576-577.
362
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
452.
363
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
452.
243