The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
149.
Mr Blair and
President Bush also confirmed that:
“Coalition
forces will remain in Iraq as long as necessary to help the Iraqi
people to
build their
own political institutions and reconstruct their country, but no
longer.”
150.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told the Inquiry that:
“We would
have liked the UN to be described as playing a leading political
role with
the US and
the UK in administering Iraq as a triumvirate. That was too much
for
the United
States and President Bush came out between his own advisers and
the
Prime
Minister in describing the role that they wanted from the UN as
being vital …
without the
Prime Minister’s input we wouldn’t have got the word ‘vital’. I
think it was
something
that President Bush, as it were, gave to the Prime Minister rather
than
an American
recognition that actually the UN would be so useful that we must
make
sure that
they are encouraged to be useful.”74
151.
As discussions
were concluding in Hillsborough, the IPU in London was
raising
concerns
about the language of Gen Franks’ proposed messages to the Iraqi
people,
to be
issued once Baghdad had fallen.75
152.
A further US
draft of the Freedom Message had been supplied to Mr
Llewellyn.
He
commented to Ms Rose that it had “hardly changed from the one that
I commented
on on
28 March” and observed that the new draft contained reference to
the creation
of “a duly
authorised court”.76
Without
agreement on the jurisdiction or power of such
a court
this provision remained unsatisfactory.
153.
A note
prepared by the IPU advised that references to the Coalition
Provisional
Authority
temporarily exercising the powers of government was not considered
to be
consistent
with the Hague Regulations or the Fourth Geneva Convention. The
IPU
advised
that “at a minimum” these references should be deleted if text was
to be issued
on behalf
of the Coalition as a whole.77
154.
On 9 April, Mr
Rycroft asked for the IPU Note to be faxed to members
of
155.
On 10 April,
Mr Llewellyn advised the IPU that the main problem with the
draft
Proclamation
was that “political statements and legal requirements are jumbled
up”.79
74
Public
hearing, 15 December 2009, pages 47-48.
75
Minute IPU,
8 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Proclamation by General Franks’ attaching
Minute Franks ‘Freedom
Message to
the Iraqi People’ and Order ‘ Instructions to Citizens of Iraq and
military forces’.
76
Letter
Llewellyn to Rose, 8 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Proclamation by General
Franks’.
77
Note IPU, 8
April 2003, ‘Iraq: Post-conflict; Franks Declaration and
Instructions to Citizens of Iraq’.
78
Manuscript
comment Rycroft, 9 April 2003 on Note IPU, 8 April 2003, ‘Iraq:
Post-conflict; Franks
Declaration
and Instructions to Citizens of Iraq’.
79
Minute
Llewellyn to Bristow, 10 April 2003, ‘Freedom Message to the Iraqi
People’.
156