15.1 | Civilian
personnel
389.
Mr William
Patey, British Ambassador to Iraq, sent an audit of staff and
security
to
Mr Dominic Asquith, FCO Director Iraq, on 9
March.273
He reported
that all staff
appreciated
that working in Iraq was not without risk. The UK’s safety record
was good:
“Since 2003
we have only suffered two fatal casualties in Baghdad, a DFID
oil
contractor274
and a CRG
team member. In Basra two CRG personnel were killed
by the
first Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) in July
2005.275
“Staff have
reacted well to recent events … I have reiterated that all staff
are
volunteers
and if at any time they feel anxious they should make their
concerns
known. They
are free to leave and no‑one would think the worse of them.
No‑one
has asked
to leave.”
390.
Mr Patey
recommended no change to staff levels in Baghdad:
•
Reducing
the number of consular staff from two to one would result in no
cover
during
staff absences and leave the Consular Section short staffed
during
kidnap
cases.
•
Reducing
the size of the seven‑strong Management/Security Section
would
be
“folly”.
•
The
Political/Economic/Military Section was large by FCO standards, but
so
were the
demands on it. It could not meet those demands with fewer staff
while
ensuring
they received the decompression breaks to which they were
entitled.
•
The single
Commercial Officer was needed to cover trade promotion and
air
service
matters.
•
The Head of
DFID Iraq, Mr Tim Foy, “takes security seriously and
liaises
constantly
with us and DFID London”. Mr Foy did not think the security
situation
warranted a
drawdown of DFID staff.
•
2006 was
“the year of the Police”. There was a large Civilian Police
Section,
but the key
UK objective of support to the Iraqi Police Service would have
to
be curtailed
if numbers were reduced.
391.
Mr Patey
advised that numbers could be reduced In Basra, but that it would
have
a severe
impact on the service offered “while having a negligible effect on
the risk”.
He advised
that numbers would have to be cut “drastically” to reduce the
risk appreciably.
392.
Mr Patey
explained that risk assessments were reviewed and amended on a
daily
basis and
in response to each incident:
“Recent
changes have been a more rigorous pre‑screening to ensure staff
are
fit enough
to cope with security measures and don’t pose a danger to
themselves
and others;
and the provision of fixed accommodation at BIAP [Basra
International
273
Letter
Patey to Asquith, 9 March 2006, ‘Staff and Security
Audit’.
274
DFID and
the FCO have informed the Inquiry that the consultant was
contracted by the FCO, not DFID.
275
The first
EFP attack in Basra was on 29 May 2005, not in July (see Section
14.1).
311