The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

584. Mr de Villepin made clear that the decision would be made by President

Chirac.

585. In the conversation with Mr de Villepin on 17 October, Mr Straw reminded him of

his “undertaking not to veto” a second resolution “if Iraq were obviously in breach, and of

his suggestion that France might participate in military action even if someone else had

vetoed (following the Kosovo precedent)”. Mr de Villepin had not demurred.189

586. Mr Straw told Mr de Villepin that Secretary Powell had “moved mountains

to accommodate French concerns” and that the draft resolution “referred explicitly

to a further meeting of the Council”:

“The US could not accept language requiring a further SCR, but they accepted that

a further meeting implied a second SCR whether moved by them or other members

of the Council. There was no need to spell this out …”

587. Mr de Villepin:

“… described the new text as very good and a basis for final agreement. He

accepted the need for some ambiguity, so was prepared to agree the verb ‘consider’

rather than ‘decide’, which he recognised was too much for the US. But … [h]e

would like language along the lines of: ‘… consider the situation and any necessary

measures to ensure full compliance …’.”

588. Mr Straw warned Mr de Villepin that:

“… pressing the US for more … risked making the best the enemy of the good …

Levitte could use his EOV [Explanation of Vote] to explain the French interpretation,

even if it were not possible to get the exact language they wanted. He explained

at some length that, in English political language, ‘consider’ was an active verb

implying a subsequent decision. It was a stronger concept than the French

equivalent. He also explained that ‘need’ should be read as embracing ‘measures’.”

589. Mr de Villepin warned Mr Straw that:

“… although he entirely took the point about the debate within the US Administration,

he would have to persuade Chirac, who would probably want the text strengthened.

For Chirac the second step had to have credibility.”

590. In their further conversation, Mr Straw:

• Urged Mr de Villepin “to take Yes for an answer”, which Mr de Villepin was

reported to have “agreed; as soon as he got an answer from Chirac on

‘measures’”.

189 Telegram 223 FCO London to Paris and Washington, 17 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s

Conversation with French Foreign Minister, 17 October’.

306