6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
ensuring
Iraqi revenues were not diverted into debt or compensation
payments. By far
the most
significant factor in making that happen would be political
legitimacy conferred
by the
UN.
1013.
The Treasury
stated that OFF provided “an obvious way to pay for
immediate
humanitarian
needs”, by using the approximately US$4bn unspent in the UN
OFF
account and
restarting oil exports. That depended on oil production facilities
surviving
the
conflict relatively intact. In the most benign circumstances, with
rapidly increasing
production
and high oil prices, oil revenues “could make a very significant
contribution”
to ongoing
relief and reconstruction. Future oil revenues were another
possible source
of funds,
but, officials warned, Iraq had already accumulated “massive and
probably
unsustainable
debts” that way.
1014.
The Treasury
concluded that, given fiscal constraints in the UK and US,
total
resources
for reconstruction would be “substantially smaller if the UN were
not involved”.
That,
combined with the likelihood that the IMF and World Bank would be
unable to
engage in
such circumstances, “could make it harder to put Iraq on a path to
peace,
stability
and democracy”.
1015.
Mr Blair
discussed preparations for the Azores Summit with President
Bush
on 14
March.431
Mr Blair
said that “at some point we needed to set out our views
on
post‑conflict,
including humanitarian issues”.
1016.
The UK’s
revised ‘Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’, sent to
No.10
before the
Azores Summit, was intended to reassure the Iraqi people and
wider
audiences
of the Coalition’s intentions for Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s
departure.
1017.
The wording
of the UK draft and the later text agreed with the US
and
Spain at
the Summit made no specific or measurable commitments for which
the
Coalition
could be held directly to account.
1018.
The FCO
background papers sent to No.10 before the Azores Summit
included
a revised
version of the UK’s ‘Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi
People’.
1019.
The IPU
explained to Mr Straw’s Private Office that the intention was
for the
Vision to
be:
“… launched
in a manner that provides maximum impact, both with the Iraqi
people
and with
wider public opinion. The Vision and the messages accompanying
its
launch will
be critical to reassuring Iraqis and the Arab world about our
post-conflict
objectives
…
431
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 14 March’.
493