The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

on fatalities, drawing on whatever information was available. The Government could

then assess how “credible (and helpful) the information would be publicly”. Mr Quarrey

concluded:

“If the trial is successful, we could look at outsourcing to a credible external

organisation (e.g. a think‑tank or academics).”

133. Mr Blair agreed that approach.90

134. Mr Quarrey wrote to the MOD on 18 October, to confirm that he had asked the

Cabinet Office to convene a meeting to discuss how to take forward a trial monitoring

period “in order to demonstrate more effectively the harm being inflicted by terrorism in

Iraq”.91 Copies of Mr Quarrey’s letter were sent to the FCO and other departments.

135. A Cabinet Office official chaired a meeting on 22 October to plan how to take

forward the trial monitoring period.92 During the meeting, officials stated that there was

a risk that the UK might come under pressure to disclose publicly any conclusions that

were reached. Mr Quarrey told the meeting that No.10 believed that the UK needed to

make a “serious attempt to quantify what is happening”.

136. Officials agreed that:

• The “headline task” was to quantify, as precisely as possible, the number of

civilian deaths caused by a) insurgents and b) coalition military action (both

MNF – I and the Iraqi Security Forces).

• The best way to do that was to break the task down. The FCO would report from

open sources, the MOD would report from Multi‑National Division (South‑East)

(MND(SE))93 using existing military reporting systems, and JTAC/PJHQ would

analyse US statistics on casualties.

• The trial period would run for the month of November.

137. An MOD official wrote to the Cabinet Office on 28 October, setting out the MOD’s

concerns about the trial process.94 The MOD’s position remained that it did not believe

it was possible to establish an accurate methodology for estimating the total number of

civilian casualties. Although incident reports could be analysed, there was a danger that:

“… once we have adopted a methodology, Parliament and the public would in future

expect us to apply this no matter what the intensity of the operation.”

90 Email Quarrey to Bowen, 18 October 2004, ‘Iraq Civilian Casualties’.

91 Letter Quarrey to Naworynsky, 18 October 2004, ‘Iraq’.

92 Letter Cabinet Office [junior official] to Ad Hoc Cabinet Office Group on Civilian Casualties in Iraq,

25 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Civilian Casualties’.

93 MND(SE) comprised the four provinces in southern Iraq for which the UK had security responsibility.

94 Letter MOD [junior official] to Cabinet Office [junior official], 28 October 2004, [untitled].

194