6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
527.
A JIC
Assessment of 21 August concluded that in a conflict
Saddam
Hussein
would order missile strikes and the use of CBW against coalition
Forces,
supporting
regional states and Israel.
528.
The JIC had
little intelligence on Iraq’s CBW and little insight into how
it
would
fight. Its conclusions reflected the Committee’s own
judgements.
529.
At the request
of the MOD, the JIC issued an Assessment on 21 August
considering
“what diplomatic options Saddam has to deter, avert or limit the
scope of
a US‑led
attack”.219
It also
considered his “military options for facing a US‑led
attack”
and how his
analysis about each course of action might “change as an attack
becomes
increasingly
imminent”.
530.
The JIC
examined Iraq’s options for the short term, whether Saddam
Hussein
might seize
the initiative, how Iraq might respond to a US military build‑up,
Saddam’s
options in
“war” – including the use of missiles and WMD and “alternative
scenarios and
at the
death”.
531.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements on the military options were:
•
Much as
Saddam Hussein would like to seize the initiative before a US
attack,
his options
remained limited. He was “likely to be cautious about using
force
early. But
the closer and more credible an attack seemed, the more risks he
will
be willing
to take, perhaps including deniable terrorist attacks, most likely
in the
Gulf region
– though we cannot exclude a threat to the UK.”
•
“Early on
in any conflict, Saddam would order missile attacks on Israel,
coalition
forces and
regional states providing the US with bases.”
•
“Saddam
would order the use of CBW against coalition forces at some
point,
probably
after a coalition attack had begun. Once Saddam was
convinced
that his
fate was sealed, he would order the unrestrained use of CBW
against
coalition
forces, supporting regional states and Israel.”
•
“Iraq would
probably try to ride out air strikes while conserving its ground
forces.
Iraq’s
likely strategy for a ground war would be to make any coalition
advance as
slow and
costly as possible, trying to force the coalition to fight in urban
areas.”
•
“There is a
significant potential for Saddam to miscalculate, either by
escalating
a crisis at
an early stage, or by making concessions too late in the day to
avert
an
attack.”
219
JIC
Assessment, 21 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Saddam’s Diplomatic and Military
Options’.
255