The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
105.
Mr Nye
also identified the need to consider long‑term, post‑conflict
military
costs. The
US appeared to envisage a “quite lengthy occupation/reconstruction
effort”.
Mr Nye commented:
“Although
some in the MOD hope that British participation in the original
conflict
would
exempt us from having to play a large role in the subsequent
peacekeeping …
this is not
realistic … the UK may well face a situation like Kosovo, having to
be
involved in
policing an occupied country post conflict: possibly £0.5 billion a
year …
for several
years.”
106.
Mr Nye
concluded: “If you want to influence the Prime Minister
[Mr Blair] in
considering
the scale of the UK commitment, you should talk to him next
week.”
107.
Mr Hoon
wrote to Mr Blair on 15 October, seeking a decision that week
on whether
the US
should be offered Package 3 on the same basis as Package 2, as a
possible
UK
contribution to a conflict.80
Mr Hoon
stated that Package 2 was likely to cost up to
£1bn and
Package 3 between £1.5bn and £2bn.
108.
An MOD paper
attached to Mr Hoon’s minute stated that the larger the
UK’s
contribution
to military action in the war‑fighting phase, the “more plausibly
we will be
able to
argue that we have done our bit”. It also stated that the MOD could
not yet
estimate
the cost of all the components of a campaign: the cost estimates
provided
in the
paper were therefore “ball‑park figures”.
109.
Copies of the
letter and attached paper were sent to Mr Brown, Mr Straw
and
Sir Andrew
Turnbull, the Cabinet Secretary.
110.
The following
day, Sir David Manning sent Mr Blair his comments on
Mr Hoon’s
minute.81
Sir David
described some of the arguments in the minute as “pretty
dubious”,
including:
“… if we
help with the war fighting, we shall be spared the post‑conflict
washing
up. It
didn’t work like that in Afghanistan. Experience shows that once
you’re in,
you’re in
deep, without queues of grateful countries waiting to take over
when the
shooting stops.”
111.
Sir David
suggested that Mr Blair might explore a number of questions
with
Mr Hoon,
including: “Can we afford Package 3?”
80
Minute Hoon
to Prime Minister, 15 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military Options’,
attaching Paper MOD,
14 October
2002, ‘Iraq: UK Contingency Planning’.
81
Minute
Manning to Blair, 16 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Options’.
462