9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
“The
feedback from our interlocutors is positive (and we collectively
have a great
deal of
direct contact with a wide range of Iraqis, at many levels) … The
weekly
number of
attacks against the Coalition has declined from 20 in August to two
last
week (none
the week before).”260
459.
Sir Hilary
continued:
“Of course
it is not all peace and tranquillity. Violence is endemic in the
South, as it is
in Iraq
generally. Now that Saddam’s yoke has been lifted, some new
manifestations
are
becoming apparent. As in many developing countries, the irreducible
level of
violence
could end up being quite high. Tribal feuds are common … and
involve
bloodshed
as well as bravado.
…
“Also
worrying is continuing sectarian violence, although this is still
at a low level.”
460.
Sir Hilary
told the Inquiry that:
“… there
was still this tendency among some to regard the South as the
British
fiefdom,
but actually, of course, it was not insulated from external factors
and these
external
factors were very important in terms of the security and level of
violence.”261
461.
On 11 October,
Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported that Ambassador Bremer
was:
“…
determined to stick to his preferred order of events –
Constitution, referendum,
national
elections, transfer of sovereignty, if possible completed within
the next 12
months –
but is open to imaginative ideas along the way”.262
462.
On 13 October,
Lt Gen Fry put a paper to the Chiefs of Staff on the options
for
deployment
of the ARRC HQ.263
He
considered there were three options – a moderate
role in
Afghanistan from August 2004; a more extensive role in Afghanistan,
also from
August
2004; or taking over as the Coalition HQ in Iraq (fulfilling the
role then filled
by the
CJTF-7 HQ) from March 2005. He commented that all of these would
have
“significant
personnel impact across the Army”.
463.
Specifically
in relation to Iraq, Lt Gen Fry commented that:
“Since the
end of Op TELIC Phase 3, Iraq has offered the potential for the
most
challenging
and high profile employment for HQ ARRC … However, the prospect
of
deployment
into Iraq in 04/05 continues to look unlikely. It remains the
assessment
that while
US casualties are being taken at a steady rate, internationalising
the
three-star
command is doubtful. Importantly, against this backdrop, it is
difficult for
the UK to
bring its influence to bear to encourage the necessary conditions
for HQ
260
Telegram 33
Basra to FCO London, 9 October 2003, ‘South Iraq: The Political
Scene’.
261
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, page 63.
262
Telegram
211 IraqRep to FCO London, 11 October 2003, ‘Iraq: A Long Way To
Go’.
263
Minute
DCDS(C) to COSSEC, 13 October 2003, ‘HQ ARRC – options for
deployment’.
283