6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
and the US
had “stated a requirement for a divisional HQ, two light brigades,
and a
single
armoured brigade”.10
40.
Lt Gen Reith
advised that the risks to a UK division were “minimal” and that
the
“geographical
area proposed would allow the UK to set the standard in the
aftermath”.
It would be
“strategically placed to exert maximum influence during Phase
IV”.
41.
Lt Gen Reith
described the US plan as based on four assumptions:
•
“The UK
desires a significant role in land combat operations, now in the
South
as the only
viable alternative to the North.”
•
“The UK
wishes to operate at divisional level, with a divisional area
of
responsibility
(AO).”
•
“Recognition
that the UK logistic liability should be minimised.”
•
“The UK
experience in wider peacekeeping, and subsequent ability to
conduct
early Phase
IV – post conflict – operations.”
42.
Lt Gen Reith
advised that the UK had yet to “conduct a formal tactical estimate
on
the
proposed mission”; but a “formation capable of armoured manoeuvre”
was required
potentially
to protect the right flank of 1 MEF during its advance north and to
secure
Basra
International Airport and fix Iraqi forces in Basra
City.
43.
Lt Gen Reith
added that the UK “may be asked to take control of key points in
the
City during
Phase IV, having isolated it during Phase III. Should troops to
task not allow
this
operation to take place, CFLCC [Coalition Forces Land Component
Commander,
Lt Gen
McKiernan] accepts that the final securing of Basra would be a
corps task.”
44.
Lt Gen Reith
recommended the deployment of a divisional headquarters and
three
brigades to
the South; and that the armoured brigade should comprise four
battlegroups.
45.
PJHQ also
identified the need to begin thinking about the
practical
consequences
of the proposal for the UK’s post-conflict role, including the
need
for more
support from other government departments.
46.
On 7 January,
Mr Paul Flaherty, MOD Civil Secretary in PJHQ, set out
PJHQ’s
thoughts on
preparations for Phase IV in a minute to Mr Ian Lee, MOD Director
General
Operational
Policy.11
In the
absence of an agreed US inter-agency position on Phase
IV
planning, the CENTCOM commanders’ conference in Tampa, Florida on
15 and 16
January was
likely to have a significant impact on US
policy-making.
10
Minute
Reith to COSSEC, 6 January 2003, ‘Op TELIC – Southern Option’
attaching Paper ‘Op TELIC
Southern
Option – Revised’.
11
Minute
Flaherty to DG Op Pol, 7 January 2003, ‘Op TELIC: Preparing for
Phase IV’.
393