3.7 | Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

710. Sir Jeremy Greenstock stated that resolution 1441 required Iraq “visibly

and unmistakably to divest itself of weapons of mass destruction immediately,

unconditionally and actively”; that had not happened and the US and UK had

concluded that Iraq had decided to defy the international community.

711. A meeting of the Security Council was held on 24 February at the request

of the UK.208

712. A draft of a second resolution was tabled by the UK, US and Spain. The draft

operative paragraphs stated simply that the Security Council:

• “Decides that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it by

resolution 1441”; and

• “Decides to remain seized of the matter.”209

713. Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Security Council that:

“The co-sponsors are convinced that Iraq is not achieving, nor intending to achieve,

the objective of SCR 1441 … its unanimous message represented a powerful

signal that the UN was in control. The Security Council was challenged by the

US President to raise its game on its most difficult agenda item … The resolution

set out the most stringent terms ever decided upon by the United Nations for the

process of disarmament. But there was also an olive branch … Iraq was given every

incentive to repair its documented non-compliance.

“Today, 15 weeks on … we are no further advanced towards that objective of

complete disarmament. Indeed, nor is Iraq taking adequate steps to correct its wider

breaches of 687, including its support for terrorism. The terms of resolution 1441 are

not being respected …”210

714. Sir Jeremy stated:

“What we all asked of Iraq was, first, a marked change from its denial and

deception of 1991 to 2002, which had already placed it in material breach of

relevant resolutions; and second, full compliance with and co-operation with the

implementation of 1441. In other words, a decision by Iraq visibly and unmistakably

to divest itself of weapons of mass destruction immediately, unconditionally and

actively. That means bringing proscribed materials or programmes to the notice of

inspectors and providing a full and credible account of Iraq’s WMD activity backed

up by documentary evidence and testimony from personnel.

208 Telegram 301 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Tabling of US/UK/Spanish

Draft Resolution: Draft Resolution’.

209 Telegram 302 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Tabling of US/UK/Spanish

Draft Resolution: Draft Resolution’.

210 Telegram 303 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Tabling of US/UK/Spanish

Draft Resolution: UK Statement’.

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