The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

“Do you agree that these are the main things we should be focusing on?”

763. Mr Blair replied: “Yes but if the report is weak it will be v[ery] hard to succeed.”421

764. No.10 sent a separate record of the meeting between Mr Duelfer and Sir Nigel

Sheinwald and Mr Scarlett to Mr Straw’s Private Office.422 The record stated:

“• Duelfer said that he hoped to put together a ‘compelling case’ that the Saddam

regime had put in place a system to ‘sustain the intellectual capital’ for a

WMD programme, with a ‘break-out capacity’ once a decision to reinstate the

programme was taken.

• Duelfer said that, while he was slightly more optimistic than when he took up

the job that actual WMD might be found, the odds were still that they would not

be located. He was looking into the possibility that some had been smuggled

into Syria.

• He had not realised the extent of the fears of potential interviewees, either of

prosecution by the Americans or of assassination by former colleagues.

• If stocks of WMD did not exist, then they would have been destroyed long before

the Iraq campaign.

• The core group around Saddam had been remarkably successful in eroding

sanctions up to 9/11, including by manipulating some members of the Security

Council. He believed that the ISG would be able to demonstrate that the regime

had been thwarting UN sanctions and making plans to resuscitate its WMD

programmes … It was clear that the regime’s ultimate goal had been to obtain

nuclear weapons. There had been a policy of continuing WMD development

under the cover of ‘dual use’ programmes.

• …

• Duelfer said that Washington might have misled us about his touchiness about

UK advice: in fact he welcomed advice although he could not guarantee he

would take it. He would take into account advice on public perceptions in the UK.

• The interim report would be a status report, with no new revelations, and a

forward look … Duelfer would certainly not be pulling back on Kay’s fundamental

contention that Saddam had been in clear breach of resolution 1441.”

765. Mr Blair commented that Mr Duelfer “still needs to list any UN breaches with

supporting evidence”.423

421 Manuscript comment Blair on Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 26 March 2004, ‘Iraq: ISG’.

422 Letter Cannon to Adams, 26 March 2004, ‘Iraq Survey Group’.

423 Manuscript comment Blair on Letter Cannon to Adams, 26 March 2004, ‘Iraq Survey Group’.

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