3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
539.
Sir David
reported that, in the context of a discussion about France’s
arguments for
more time
and that war should be avoided to prevent a conflagration in the
Middle East,
Dr Rice
had said President Bush “was not prepared to wait for months and
months”.
Sir David’s
view was that:
“If
military action proved necessary, it would be better to do it
sooner rather than
later in
terms of managing our relations with the Arab world … the argument
for not
rushing our
fences applied much more strongly to Western … countries. We
had
to convince
our public opinions that the inspection process was serious, that
it had
produced
serious evidence, and that this was the basis for a second
resolution.”
540.
Sir David
commented that he was “encouraged” by the response to his
arguments
about “the
political pressures and realities … and the need for time and
evidence”.
541.
Mr Straw
warned Sir David Manning on 16 January that the
momentum
in
Washington was to do something soon after 27 January, and it was
being
assumed
that Mr Blair would be with President Bush.
542.
Mr Straw
recommended that Mr Blair should speak to President
Bush.
543.
Sir David
Manning agreed, reiterating his advice that more time was
required.
544.
On 16 January,
Mr Straw discussed the UK’s need for more time and
“decisions
no earlier
than March and April rather than January and February”, as
Sir David Manning
had told
Dr Rice the previous day, with Secretary
Powell.184
545.
Reporting the
conversation to Sir David, Mr Straw warned that the
momentum in
Washington
to do something soon after 27 January was “running very high”. It
might
be
“virtually impossible” for the US to follow the timetable of “no
deadlines” set out in
resolution
1284.
546.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell that there had been “unanimous support”
for
Mr Blair’s
position “after a good discussion in Cabinet”.
547.
Mr Straw
also advised that assumptions were being made that Mr Blair
would be
with
President Bush “in any event”. The US could not create a Coalition
without the UK;
and it
would be hard to imagine the US taking military action without the
UK.
548.
Mr Straw
recommended that Mr Blair should talk to President Bush in the
middle
of the
following week “before the draft State of the Union speech is put
to bed”.
549.
Sir David
Manning told Mr Blair that he agreed with Mr Straw’s
recommendation,
commenting
that it would be easier for the UK if there were “major
inspection
successes”.185
He also
wrote: “Giving ourselves until March/April is a luxury we
can
184
Letter
Straw to Manning, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Colin
Powell, 16 January’.
185
Manuscript
comments Manning to Prime Minister, 16 January 2003, on Letter
Straw to Manning,
16 January
2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Colin Powell, 16
January’.
97