The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
216.
Mr Blair
proposed that these areas should be drawn into a plan by the ITG,
which
the UK and
US could then support.
217.
On 3 February,
just before the announcement of the election results, the
Joint
Intelligence
Committee (JIC) assessed the nature and strength of the
insurgency.131
Despite
operational successes in Sunni areas:
“… the
military campaign is not effectively containing the insurgency in
Sunni areas.
Law and
order, the pace of economic reconstruction, the availability of
jobs and
general
quality of life have not matched [Sunni] expectations. Most Sunnis
perceive
themselves
to be worse off economically, and in security terms than under
Saddam.
Sunni
‘hearts and minds’ are being lost.”
218.
The JIC
assessed that the election results were likely to be less important
in
determining
Sunni support for the insurgency than the degree to which credible
Sunnis
could be
brought into the political process, “the speed at which
reconstruction is taken
forward”
and the duration of the coalition’s presence in Iraq.
219.
A revised
Cabinet Office strategy, drawing on the JIC assessment, was
submitted
to the 9
February Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq, chaired by
Mr Blair.132
The
key
elements of
the strategy for the coming year were:
•
building
the capability of the ISF;
•
outreach by
the ITG to bring in those currently supporting the
insurgency;
•
drawing in
the international community and giving it a new sense of
purpose
(including
getting the UN to do more on reconstruction); and
•
“reviewing
reconstruction to find ways to make a difference
quickly”.
220.
The strategy
identified key “governance and reconstruction” challenges in
2005,
including:
•
the weak
capacity of Iraqi Government institutions to drive
reconstruction;
•
sustained
improvements in the availability of fuel and electricity needing
difficult
reforms and
a crackdown on corruption and sabotage;
•
the limited
presence on the ground of international agencies and NGOs;
and
•
ensuring
all Iraq benefited (“the South is not a strategic priority for the
US”).
221.
The six
“governance and reconstruction” actions for the UK before the ITG
was
formed
were:
•
preparing
key messages to the new government on reconstruction
priorities,
focusing on
developing a stronger relationship between Baghdad and
the
governorates;
•
working
with the US to make its reconstruction effort more effective. The
US
should
focus on rapid job creation, and directly fund Iraqi
ministries;
131
JIC
Assessment, 3 February 2005, ‘Iraq: Insurgency and
Counter-Insurgency’.
132
Paper
Cabinet Office, 7 February 2005, ‘Iraq Strategy for
2005’.
232