3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
374.
Sir David
reported that President Bush wanted to hear Mr Blair’s
views
before
taking decisions, and that Mr Blair would have real
influence.
375.
Sir David
also warned that there was a risk that the US Administration
was
underestimating
the difficulties.
376.
In his
discussions with Dr Rice on Iraq in mid-March, Sir David Manning
recorded
that he had
“made it clear that we would continue to give strong support to the
idea of
regime
change, but we were looking to the US to devise a convincing plan
of action.
This would
also need to answer the question of who would follow
Saddam.” 136
377.
Sir David told
Dr Rice that a series of issues would need to be addressed if the
US
decided on
military action against Iraq.
378.
One was
whether the US “wanted company”. If it wanted the support of a
coalition,
it would
have to address a number of concerns that would be critical in
determining the
attitude of
potential partners. Those were the need to:
•
“mount a
public information campaign explaining the nature of Saddam’s
regime
and the
nature of the threat he posed”;
•
“describe
the role that the US envisaged for the UN, and particularly for
the
weapons
inspectors”;
•
“provide a
convincing plan setting out how a combination of outside
military
pressure,
and external and internal opposition could topple Saddam”;
and
•
“provide an
equally convincing blueprint for a post Saddam Iraq … acceptable
to
its
neighbours as well as to its own population”.
Preparing
public opinion and deciding who and what might replace Saddam
Hussein
were tough
propositions.
379.
Sir David
Manning told Dr Rice that the UK “hoped shortly to publish
an
unclassified
paper giving as much detail as possible about Saddam’s WMD
programme”.
The UK
would “share as much as possible” as a way of convincing
governments and
public
opinion of the dangers of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
380.
Sir David also
pointed out the importance of taking:
“… time and
trouble over the UN observers. Demonstrating to international
opinion
that Saddam
was in breach of the UNSCRs and continued to thwart the
activities
of Blix [Dr
Hans Blix, the Executive Chair of UNMOVIC] and his team was a
crucial
part of
coalition building … It should not be impossible to persuade
moderate public
opinion
that it was Saddam who was at fault if he flouted the conditions
and blocked
the
inspectors … we should find ways of getting him to speak out
publicly about
what his
inspection team would need if they were to function
effectively.”
136
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 14 March 2002, ‘Discussions with Condi Rice on
12-13 March’.
453