The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
offer
advice on what might constitute “a satisfactory plan for
the
aftermath”
or the consequences of failure to reach agreement with the
US
on such a
plan; or
•
adequately
consult the FCO or DFID before submitting his
recommendation.
1132.
Mr Hoon
should have questioned those omissions before advising Mr
Blair
on an issue
of such significance.
1133.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit, as PUS, should have ensured that those issues
were
covered in
more detail in the advice put to Mr Hoon.
1134.
On Mr Ehrman’s
recommendation, Mr Straw sent a letter to Mr Blair on
17 January
flagging up “three major issues” in Mr Hoon’s proposal: targeting,
Iraqi use
of WMD
and the “aftermath”.543
Mr Straw
advised that:
“… much
greater clarity is required about US thinking and plans for the
aftermath.
How long
would UK forces be expected to stay in the area of responsibility
proposed
for them?
What would be their role in what form of administration, not least
in
Basra …?
We need in particular far greater clarity on US thinking on
management of
the
oilfields. As you know, we have sizeable differences of view from
many in the US
Administration
who envisage Iraq being a US military governorate for an
extended
period of
time. A UK team will be discussing this issue with the US next
week. It will
be putting
hard questions, and highlighting our own view that there needs to
be a
move to UN
administration, with Coalition forces remaining responsible for
security,
as soon as
possible.”
1135.
Mr Straw’s
minute was not sent to Ms Short.
1136.
Like Mr
Hoon, Mr Straw did not give due consideration to what
might
constitute
a satisfactory plan for the UK and whether UK participation in
military
action
should be conditional on such a plan.
1137.
Sir David
Manning commented to Mr Blair: “Good questions. But I don’t think
they
affect your
decision in principle [to deploy forces].”544
1139.
Mr Hoon’s
recommendations were endorsed by Mr Blair on 17
January.546
543
Minute
Ehrman to Private Secretary [FCO], 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’;
Minute Straw
to Prime Minister, 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
544
Manuscript
comment Manning on Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 17 January
2003,
‘Iraq: UK
Land Contribution’.
545
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 17 January
2003,
‘Iraq: UK
Land Contribution’.
546
Letter
Manning to Watkins, 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
304