The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Blair and
the UK are in Afghanistan with us for the long haul. He readily
committed
to deploy
1700 commandos, even though his experts warn that British forces
are
overstretched
… […].
“On Iraq,
Blair will be with us should military operations be necessary. He
is
convinced
on two points: the threat is real; and success against Saddam will
yield
more
regional success. Aside from his foreign and defense secretaries,
however,
Blair’s
Cabinet shows signs of division, and the Labour Party and the
British public
are
unconvinced that military action is warranted now. Blair may
suggest ideas
on how to
(1) make a credible public case on current Iraqi threats to
international
peace; (2)
keep Iraq’s neighbours on our side; (3) handle calls for a UNSC
blessing
that can
increase support for us in the region and with UK and European
audiences;
and (4)
demonstrate that we have thought through ‘the
day-after.’
“The UK
will follow our lead in the Middle East, but Blair may seek greater
US
engagement
[…] He will argue that continued terrorist violence and Israeli
military
action are
rapidly sapping European and Arab support for a tough line on
Baghdad.
[…]
“… He is
sharply criticised by the media for being too pro-US in foreign and
security
policy, too
arrogant and ‘presidential’ (not a compliment …
“Blair
knows he may have to pay a political price for supporting us on
Iraq, and
wants to
minimize it. Nonetheless, he will stick with us on the big issues.
His voters
will look
for signs that Britain and America are truly equity partners in the
special
relationship.”
555.
The US
Embassy in London reported on 2 April that MPs in the Labour
Party
were
opposed to military action and identified the actions likely to be
needed to
secure
their support.
556.
Mr Blair’s
challenge was to judge the timing and evolution of America’s
Iraq
policy, and
to bring his party and the British people on board, so that the UK
could
be the
“keystone” for any coalition the US wanted to build.
557.
On 2 April, a
telegram from Ambassador William Farish, US Ambassador to
the
UK,
reported that “for a noticeable time after” President Bush had
“identified Iraq’s
development
of WMD and missiles as a serious threat” in his State of the Union
speech
on 26
January, Mr Blair’s Government “essentially kept quiet on whether
it agreed”.212
That had
“changed at the end of February” when Mr Blair “spoke out
forcefully” at the
Commonwealth
Heads of Government Meeting in Australia.
212
Telegram
7579 from AMEMBASSY London to SECSTATE Washington, 2 April 2002,
‘Iraq
Coalition‑Building:
UK Labor Party Not Yet Convinced’.
488