The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Conclusion
The JIC
concluded that the declaration so far analysed failed to address
the outstanding
issues from
UNSCOM’s report to the Security Council in 1999 and “made no
attempt to
answer any
of the points outlined in the UK dossier”. Iraq might:
“… feel
they dealt with these points in their previous rebuttal of the
dossier. Some of
the
deficiencies may be addressed in the parts yet to be translated,
but this does not
look
likely.”
321.
On 20
December, Mr Miller sent Sir David Manning a further DIS
overview of the
322.
Mr Miller
re‑stated the key findings outlined in the 18 December JIC
Assessment
and
identified the principal areas of apparent omission. The main new
points identified
were:
“•
an
admission by the Iraqis that they have delivered 50 Al Samoud
missiles to
their
military. The UK dossier stated that at least 50 of these missiles
had been
produced
and were being deployed to military units;
•
details of
missile related procurement activities post‑1998, which Iraq
claims
were for
permitted programmes. There are no details concerning the origin
of
the
material and equipment procured, some of which we judge were
obtained
illicitly;
•
the
document fails to cover refurbishment at potential BW
sites.”
323.
Mr Miller
reported that the DIS would continue to analyse the declaration
when
a full
English text was available from the UN. That was likely to be after
Christmas.
324.
On 18
December, the JIC also discussed a letter of 13 December from
Mr Miller
on the
cohesion of the Iraqi regime.111
325.
The main point
raised was that the fundamental judgement of the JIC
of
6 December
had not changed, “especially that nothing short of a massive
Coalition force
was
guaranteed to threaten the regime enough to topple it”. There were,
however, “more
areas of
pressure building within the regime, although it was still
impossible to say how
and when it
might fracture”. The Iraqi people’s perceptions of Saddam Hussein’s
position
would be
“crucial”. The two “tipping points” would be when:
•
“people
decided that they would be better off without Saddam”;
and
•
“they
decided that he had finally lost control”.
326.
The JIC “would
need to keep coming back to this subject as events
developed
in the
New Year”.
110
Minute
Miller to Manning, 20 December 2002, ‘Iraq: WMD
Declaration’.
111 Minutes, 18
December 2002, JIC meeting.
60