The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
564.
Maj Gen Binns
told the Inquiry that “there were some serious shortfalls” which
were
eventually
“helped by a redistribution of ammunition across the
division”.294
He
described
a
particular problem with ammunition for Warrior
vehicles:
“We
couldn’t find the operational ammunition for the Warrior. We knew
that it had
left
Bicester and there was evidence that it had arrived in Kuwait, and
there was a
risk, a
real risk, that ammunition was in such short supply that we may
have fired
it in
training. And because the ammunition had just been taken to the
range, they
naturally
assumed that that was the ammunition, and I thought we had fired
it. So
there was a
risk over ammunition.”
565.
With only four
months’ preparation, equipment had, in a number of cases,
arrived
a month
or two after the operation started.
566.
Despite the
public assurances given prior to the invasion that
previously
identified
problems had been resolved, Combat ID equipment was not fitted to
all
vehicles
before the start of operations.
567.
Nine
blue-on-blue incidents, four of which resulted in the
death295
or injury of
UK
personnel,
were reported during the combat phase of Op TELIC.296
568.
At Lord Bach’s
UOR meeting on 1 April 2003, it was reported that “the story
overall
on
equipment was positive” but despite having the same equipment as
the US, “we were
going to
‘come in for a schlocking’ on Combat ID”.297
The record
of the meeting did not
explain
why.
569.
A note from
Maj Gen Fry to Adm Boyce on 2 April stated that only
1,861 sets of
Combat ID
had been provided for 1 (UK) Div vehicles, 30 percent of the total
required.298
By the date
of the invasion, all vehicles had been fitted for the equipment,
but “due to the
mal-location
of two containers two Squadrons were not fitted with the
equipment”. The
containers
“were subsequently found and sent forward so that units could be
fitted with
Combat ID
when an appropriate moment occurred”.
570.
The minute
from Mr Flaherty on 9 May detailed the extent of the
problem:
“Three ISO
containers of Combat ID were temporarily misplaced in theatre
meaning
32
Challenger 2s were not fitted with combat identification prior to
the start of
combat
operations. All tanks in the two lead battle groups, were, however,
fitted
with Combat
ID. GOC 1 Division assessed that proceeding with the advance
without
294
Private
hearing, 2 June 2010, pages 4-5.
295
Flight
Lieutenant Kevin Barry Main, Flight Lieutenant David Rhys Williams,
Corporal Stephen Allbutt,
Trooper
David Clarke and Lance Corporal of Horse Matty Hull were killed in
these incidents.
296
Report DOC,
17 October 2003, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study’.
297
Minute
APS/Minister(DP) to MA/DCDS(EC), 1 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC
– UORs’.
298
Minute
DCJO(Ops) to PSO/CDS, 2 April 2003, ‘Combat ID and
ECBA’.
92