The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
339.
During the two
days of testimony, Ambassador Crocker and Gen Petraeus
were
questioned
on the UK’s approach in Basra. A briefing paper on key points from
those
exchanges
recorded that:
•
Asked
whether he agreed with the British drawdown and withdrawal from
Basra
City, Gen
Petraeus said he did.
•
Asked
whether the British had lost Basra, Gen Petraeus said: “The British
did
a good
hand-off to a force that was trained and equipped and certified to
hand
off the
palace … There’s no question but that there is a competition down
there
between the
Fadhila Party, the Supreme Council, the Badr Corps, and
certainly
Sadr’s
party and militia. Interestingly, there have been deals there
recently, and
the
violence level has just flat plummeted. It’s included some release
of some
Jaysh
al-Mahdi figures – again accommodations between all of them. Again
for
the Shia
south, that’s probably ok.”
•
Asked why
the British had a force protection mission whereas the US had
a
population
protection mission, Gen Petraeus said that this was due to the lack
of
sectarian
violence in Basra.
•
Asked
whether he could foresee a situation where US troops may have to
be
committed
to Basra, Gen Petraeus said: “I don’t think that we need to put
US
forces in
southern provinces, other than, say, some special forces teams
or
occasionally
sending something down to help out.”172
340.
A few days
after the testimony, Mr Prentice reported that it had “not
been the
climactic
political event here which many were expecting a few weeks ago” but
now
that it was
over “the Iraqi political class know better where the US stand and
what is
341.
Mr Brown
spoke to President Bush by video conference on 10
September.174
342.
The briefing
provided for the conversation suggested he emphasise that
no
decisions
had been taken on a radical drawdown of UK troops and that the UK
remained
committed
both to the coalition and to supporting Iraq’s stability and
development.175
343.
Officials
assessed that President Bush was unlikely to make any
fundamental
changes to
US policy in the medium term; rather, his focus would be on
short-term
management
of the surge. The briefing said:
“Although
US commanders in Iraq did sign off on the Palace move [in
Basra],
Washington
report continued anxiety on the part of US officers and
policy-makers
172
Paper
[unattributed], [undated], ‘Crocker & Petraeus – Key Quotes
& Exchanges’.
173
eGram
37677/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 13 September 2007, ‘Iraq: Future UK
Posture;
What is at
Stake?’
174
Letter
Fletcher to Hickey, 10 September 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush,
10 September:
Middle East’.
175
Briefing
[unattributed], 10 September 2007, ‘Bush VTC’.
248