9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
1052.
On 26 May, the
JIC provided its assessment of the prospects for security in
the
Centre
South region, in light of the potential deployment of UK troops
there.588
Among
its
Key
Judgements were:
“I. Centre
South is a more volatile region than the South East and a nexus
of
intricate
Shia politics. The security challenge is also more complex, and UK
forces
deployed
into Centre South could face a somewhat greater level of risk
than
experienced
in the South East …
II. Good
relations with Shia leaders, principally the Hawza, are a key
requirement for
maintaining
Shia consent. A successful extension of British influence to the
Centre
South could
bring greater consistency of policy and therefore stability to the
Shia
areas as a
whole.
III.
Al-Sadr’s political isolation appears to be deepening. But if he is
killed or captured
by
Coalition Forces further, potentially widespread, violence is
likely. In any case,
some Mahdi
Army militants will continue to attack the Coalition and represent
a
long‑term
threat.”
1053.
The JIC
considered that, in the short term, the Iraqi security forces would
be
unable to
cope with a determined armed challenge without the help of
Coalition Forces.
1054.
On 26 May,
Mr Richmond reported that JAM fighters seemed to be
returning
to Baghdad,
and had withdrawn from Karbala.589
The Shia
leadership had contacted
Muqtada
al-Sadr, who had offered to withdraw from Najaf and all government
buildings,
allowing
the Iraqi Security Forces to return. His condition was that the
Coalition should
also
withdraw from Najaf and put the legal case against him on hold
until there was a
sovereign
Iraqi government.
1055.
The CPA
responded that efforts should be made to secure an undertaking
that
JAM would
disarm and dissolve as well as withdraw.
1056.
On 27 May,
Mr Blair met Mr Hoon, Mr Straw, Mr Benn, Gen
Walker and others to
discuss the
Chiefs’ advice on the US request for additional UK
troops.590
1057.
Mr Rycroft’s
record of the meeting shows that Mr Blair agreed that
Mr Hoon
should
announce the uplift for MND(SE), and that:
“… there
was a short discussion – but no decisions – on the options for a UK
military
contribution
to the wider South … The Prime Minister said that of course we must
do
what was
necessary for the success of the overall mission in Iraq. These
operational
military
judgements must take precedence over any political
considerations.”
588
JIC
Assessment, 26 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Security Prospects in Centre
South’.
589
Telegram
259 IraqRep to FCO London, 26 May 2004, ‘Muqtada al
Sadr’.
590
Letter
Rycroft to Baker, 27 May 2004, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Presence’.
379