11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
45.
On 14 May,
Mr Tony Brenton, Chargé d’Affaires at the British Embassy
Washington,
was shown a
draft diplomatic cable setting out Washington’s guidance to
Ambassador
Bremer on
the implementation of the de‑Ba’athification
policy.30
46.
Mr Brenton
reported to the FCO that the cable proposed that full Ba’ath
Party
members
(group, section and branch members) would be banned from public
office,
including
teaching positions. They would also be interviewed and an
evaluation made
of whether
they may have committed criminal acts or continued to pose a risk
to the
security of
the Coalition.
47.
To implement
this, all individuals in the top three layers of management in
each
government
Ministry would be evaluated to establish the extent of their Ba’ath
Party
involvement.
Those proven to be members would be removed. For junior
employees
below the
top three layers, evaluation would not be automatic but the
discovery of any
“adverse
information” would lead to their investigation.
48.
The Annotated
Agenda prepared by the Cabinet Office for a meeting of the Ad
Hoc
Ministerial
Group on Iraq Rehabilitation (AHMGIR) the following day asked
Ministers to:
“… agree
that we press in principle for the removal from public service and
politics
[of] only
the top three tiers of the Ba’ath Party.”31
49.
The Annotated
Agenda stated that extending the ban to the fourth tier of the
Ba’ath
Party (and
so to 30,000 people) would be “excessive and detrimental to public
service
provision”.
50.
At the meeting
of the AHMGIR on 15 May, Mr Straw stated that the Coalition
should
be
“flexible” in its approach to de‑Ba’athification, “for example
excluding many who
had been
part of Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus, but fewer from more
technical
51.
The Group
amended the objective proposed by officials to:
“… press
for the removal from public service and politics of those members
of the
Ba’ath
Party judged to have played a malign role.”
52.
On 15 May,
Mr Sawers reported that the de‑Ba’athification policy had been
agreed
along the
lines reported earlier by Mr Brenton.33
53.
On the
question of whether the bar should extend to the fourth level of
party
membership,
Mr Sawers reported that he had “warned of the danger of
overkill” but, like
30
Telegram
655 Washington to FCO London, 14 May 2003, ‘Iraq: US
Views’.
31
Annotated
Agenda, 15 May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
32
Minutes, 15
May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
33
Telegram 10
IraqRep to FCO London, 15 May 2003, ‘Iraq:
De‑Ba’athification’.
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