3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
the first
inspections were well under way. Iraq’s tactics appeared to be
co‑operation
on practical
arrangements but no real change in their approach to giving up
their WMD.
143.
Mr Blair
agreed with Dr Blix that the preference was Iraqi compliance
and that the
“inspections
should not be a game of hide and seek”. Mr Blair concluded
that “one of the
reasons for
a strong multi‑lateral approach on Iraq was to deter
others”.
144.
Sir David
Manning said that Dr Blix should audit the declaration and
be
ready to
audit new material supplied by the UK and US. Mr Blair
“strongly agreed.
He emphasised
that it was important the Iraqis knew that if Blix found their
declaration to
be false it
would constitute a material breach”. Dr Blix had “agreed”,
adding that “denying
access
would also be a material breach”.
145.
Dr Blix
provided an informal briefing to the Security Council on 25
November
reporting
on his and Dr ElBaradei’s visit to Baghdad from 18 to 19
November.47
They had
been assured that Iraq intended to provide full co‑operation. The
first group
of UNMOVIC
and IAEA inspectors had arrived in Baghdad earlier on 25 November,
and
inspections
would begin on 27 November, only 19 days after the adoption of
resolution
1441. The
report to the Security Council specified in OP5 would, therefore,
be due on
27 January
2003.
146.
Dr Blix
reported that he had told Iraq that “many governments believed
that
WMD
programmes remained in Iraq”; and that “The Council had wanted to
offer Iraq
a last
opportunity. If the Iraqi side were to state – as it still did at
our meeting – that
there were
no such programmes, it would need to provide convincing
documentary
or other
evidence.” The FFCDs (Full, Final, and Complete Declarations)
submitted
by Iraq
to UNSCOM had, “in many cases left it an open question whether
some
weapons remained”.
147.
Dr Blix
also reported that he had been assured by:
•
Mr Dominique
de Villepin, the French Foreign Minister, of “firm French
support
for the
implementation stage”; and
•
Mr Blair
that the UK Government would provide “support for
effective
inspections”
and that it was determined to “ensure the implementation
of
resolution
1441 … and the elimination of WMDs and long‑range
missiles
from Iraq”.
47
UNMOVIC,
Briefing of
the Security Council on 25 November 2002, Executive Chairman’s
visit
to Baghdad.
29