The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
USURs were
submitted to PJHQ for authorisation.
•
In
addition: “Staff in PJHQ could (and did) raise USURs themselves if
they
became of
[sic] aware capability gaps.”
22.
The Inquiry
submitted a further request to the MOD in 2015, seeking
clarification
on where
the primary responsibility for identifying capability gaps lay
during Op TELIC.
23.
The MOD said
that a draft USUR “would be originated by any user” and that
“there
appears to
be no simple answer to the question where the primary
responsibility for
identifying
capability gaps and raising USURs lay”.9
The MOD
added:
“Clearly
the emphasis in the process was on the co‑operation of the
various
commands
and branches involved. But it appears that the onus for
initial
identification
of requirements, at least once a campaign was in progress, lay with
the
theatre
commander [GOC MND(SE)], while the responsibility for signing them
off lay
with PJHQ.
Between those two stages the process of analysing the requirement
and
developing
the solution was essentially a shared one.”
24.
The
Acquisition Handbook in 2002
defined the
role of Single Service Chiefs of Staff
as
to:
“… provide
overall strategic management of the individual services and
their
professional
direction. This role supports ECC decisions on capability by
providing
advice and
experience on the full range of factors contributing to military
capability,
including:
concepts and doctrine, in‑service equipment, sustainability,
training, force
structure,
decision support and personnel. Single Service Chiefs are
responsible
for
ensuring that the JCB [Joint Capabilities Board] and Capability
Working Groups
receive
appropriate input on such matters to develop future
capability.”10
25.
The Inquiry
asked General Sir John Reith, CJO from August 2001 to May
2004,
whether he
had submitted any UORs while planning for the invasion of
Iraq.11
He
replied:
“I didn’t
submit UORs. The Single Services submit the UORs, because … they
are
required to
deliver to the Chief of Joint Operations fully trained and equipped
people.
What I did
was; we screened the UORs to ensure that they were necessary
before
the MOD
approved them.”
26.
For the
Commander in Chief Land Command, that included providing advice to
the
CJO on
capability requirements for units deployed on
operations.
27.
General
Sir Richard Dannatt, Commander in Chief Land Command from
March
2005 to
August 2006, told the Inquiry that, as “the second senior member of
the Army”,
the
Commander in Chief Land Command had “an important role to play on
the Army
9
Letter
Duke‑Evans to Aldred, 26 June 2015, ‘Procuring Military
Equipment’.
10
Ministry of
Defence, Acquisition
Handbook Edition 4, January
2002.
11 Private
hearing, 15 January 2010, pages 28‑29.
8