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10.3  |  Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and stabilisation policy
to develop “longer-term strategies and options”; a well-run oil industry was essential
to Iraq’s recovery and thus to the Coalition’s overall strategy.
331.  The UK had selected Mr Terry Adams to join the CPA Oil Team as a technical
expert and Mr Ian Fletcher, Sir Andrew Turnbull’s Principal Private Secretary,179 to join
the CPA Oil Team as an oil policy expert. One of Mr Fletcher’s main tasks would be to
help develop those longer-term strategies. The DTI reported that the CPA had welcomed
Mr Adams’ appointment, but had been “less than enthusiastic” about Mr Fletcher’s,
possibly because of its view that longer-term issues should be left to the Iraqi authorities.
332.  The Annotated Agenda for the AHMGIR reported that the current Iraqi Ministry
of Oil target was to increase oil production to pre-conflict levels by April 2004; that
appeared optimistic.180 Uncertainties over oil production levels and the oil price meant
that oil revenues for 2004 remained unpredictable.
333.  The Annotated Agenda stated that:
“Our major concerns are that the CPA and Iraqi experts are focused on revising
production in the short-term and giving insufficient consideration to long-term
strategy …
“We are therefore seeking to engage the US Administration and CPA leadership
over oil sector issues in order to gain influence over decisions and policy. We are
inserting two senior people into the CPA Oil Team …”
334.  The UK and the US had agreed to establish a “senior bilateral official-level working
group” on “long-term oil sector issues”.
335.  The UK was also beginning a debate with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil on ways to
address its skills gap.
336.  Mr Bearpark commented in a meeting with DFID officials on 11 August that the UK
did not have much hope of getting senior people into the oil sector, which was “sewn up
by the US”.181 The record of that meeting was copied only within DFID.
337.  On 10 and 11 August, Basra experienced severe rioting.
179 Minute DTI [junior official] to PS/Mrs Hewitt, 23 July 2003, ‘Next Meeting of the Ad Hoc Ministerial
Group on Iraq’.
180 Annotated Agenda, 7 August 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
181 Minute DFID [junior official] to PPS/Baroness Amos, 12 August 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting with CPA Director
of Operations’.
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