The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
174.
Sir
Christopher Meyer told the Inquiry that he had advised Mr
Blair:
“‘There are
three things you really need to focus on when you get to Crawford.
One
is how to
garner international support for a policy of regime change, if that
is what it
turns out
to be. If it involves removing Saddam Hussein, how do you do it and
when
do you do
it?’ And the last thing I said, which became a kind of theme of
virtually all
the
reporting I sent back to London in that year was, ‘Above all … get
them to focus
on the
aftermath, because, if it comes to war and Saddam Hussein is
removed, and
175.
On 2 April, Mr
Blair held a meeting at Chequers to prepare for his meeting
with
President
Bush at Crawford (see Section 3.2).
176.
No formal
record was made of the discussion or who was present.
177.
Accounts given
by participants suggest that Admiral Sir Michael Boyce (Chief
of
the Defence
Staff (CDS)), Sir Kevin Tebbit (representing Mr Hoon, who was
unable to
attend), Lt
Gen Pigott, Lieutenant General Cedric Delves (senior UK liaison
officer at
CENTCOM in
Tampa, Florida), Sir Richard Dearlove (Chief of SIS), Mr Jonathan
Powell
(Mr Blair’s
Chief of Staff), Sir David Manning, Mr Alastair Campbell (Mr
Blair’s Director of
Communications
and Strategy) and Mr Scarlett were present.
178.
The FCO was
not represented.
179.
In his
diaries, Mr Campbell recorded that Lt Gen Pigott said at the
meeting:
“post‑conflict
had to be part of conflict preparation”.110
Mr Campbell
added: “There was
a discussion
about who would replace Saddam and how could we guarantee it
would
be better.
Scarlett said it couldn’t be worse.”
180.
Mr Rycroft
told the Inquiry that, around this time: “Undoubtedly the thought
was in
the Prime
Minister’s mind that if at the end of this we were going to go down
the military
intervention
route … the aftermath would be many years.”111
181.
At
Crawford, Texas, on 6 April 2002, Mr Blair and President Bush
discussed
who might
replace Saddam Hussein.
182.
There is no
evidence that Mr Blair commissioned further work on
post-
conflict
issues after Crawford, or that Mr Straw requested further work
from
FCO officials.
109
Public
hearing, 26 November 2009, pages 27-28.
110
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries.
Volume
4.
The Burden
of Power: Countdown
to
Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
111 Private
hearing, 10 September 2010, page 12.
144