The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

forces from Basra City would be to secure their complete withdrawal by attacking the

remaining base at Basra airport.”

452.  On 2 October Mr Brown visited Iraq.216 He met Prime Minister Maliki,

Vice President Hashemi, Deputy Prime Minister Saleh, Gen Petraeus and

Ambassador Crocker in Baghdad, and Maj Gen Binns and Mr Jones in Basra.

453.  The objectives for the trip were to underline:

• UK commitment to Iraq;

• the importance of building on security progress by making a decision soon to

transfer to PIC;

• the need for progress on reconciliation; and

• that economic progress was necessary as a strategic priority.217

454.  Mr Brown was provided with a briefing note on negotiations with JAM1 that

had taken place “over the last year”.218 It said that JAM had been pushed towards an

accommodation with the MNF by a combination of:

“• resolute British military action in the first half of 2007;

• a growing sense that Iranian tactical support was leading to Iranian infiltration

of the Sadrist movement;

• a realisation that the UK really did plan to leave Basra;

• the risk that British forces might be replaced by US troops;

• JAM activists in MND(SE) detention feared that a continued insurgency might

leave them marginalised.”

455.  The briefing note said that the challenge was to broaden the existing cease-fire

into a political process with backing from a wider range of Iraqi groups and the central

government. Ideally this would transform Iraqi perceptions of UK forces as an army of

occupation into acceptance of, and support for, a continuing UK military assistance and

development mission, and would expand the process beyond MND(SE).

456.  JAM1 was reported to want increased and visible UK development assistance for

Basra province as well as more detainee releases. Until the process included political

and economic elements, the cease-fire would “remain fragile and possibly short-term”.

457.  A manuscript note on the briefing note by Mr Brown’s Private Secretary recorded

that Mr Brown was grateful for the briefing and for the actions it explained. He would be

writing to offer his congratulations.219

216  Letter Fletcher to Forber, 3 October 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Iraq, 2 October’.

217  Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 1 October 2007, ‘Iraq Visit: 2 October 2007’.

218  Briefing [unattributed], [undated], ‘[NAME OF OPERATION] – moving from ceasefire to peace’.

219  Briefing [unattributed], [undated], ‘[NAME OF OPERATION] – moving from ceasefire to peace’ including

manuscript comment Fletcher.

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