4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
230.
Mr Blair
was also reported to have argued that the lessons of 9/11 meant
that such
threats
must be tackled; and that “if we don’t act we will find out too
late the potential
for destruction”.
231.
In an
article published on 5 March, Mr Straw stated that if Saddam
Hussein
refused to
co-operate with weapons inspection, he would have to live
with
the consequences.
232.
Mr Straw
provided an article, published in The
Times on 5 March,
stating that:
“The
stalemate between the United Nations and Iraq cannot go on for
ever. For
more than a
decade, Britain and the United States have led the UN’s efforts
to
protect
Iraq’s neighbours from aggression and protect the world from Iraq’s
weapons
of mass
destruction.
“Iraq
persistently flouts the authority of the UN Security Council and
international
law …
“The threat
from Iraq is not receding. Unique among the world tyrants, Saddam
has
both the
ruthlessness and capability to employ weapons of mass
destruction.”110
233.
In relation to
WMD the article stated that, since 1991:
•
“… evidence
has been building up that the threat from Iraq’s
weapons
programmes
is growing once more”.
•
“Many of
the facilities damaged in 1998 … in Operation Desert Fox
had
been repaired.”
•
Iraq had
“persisted with its chemical and biological weapons programmes”
and
was
“developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons
to targets
beyond the
150km limit imposed by the UN”.
•
There was
“evidence of increased efforts to procure nuclear-related
material
and
technology, and that nuclear research and development work
[has]
begun again”.
•
Without the
controls which had been imposed, “Saddam would have had
a
nuclear
bomb by now”.
•
Saddam
Hussein had “both the ruthlessness and capability to employ
weapons
of mass
destruction”.
•
The regime
had “admitted hiding” WMD.
•
Iraq had
admitted manufacturing chemical weapons and biological
agents:
“The destructive
potential of these weapons beggars the imagination.”
110
The
Times, 5 March
2002, Saddam must
allow weapons inspectors into Iraq or suffer the
consequences.
55