The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
930.
Once
President Bush made clear his decision to set up an
independent
inquiry,
Mr Blair’s resistance to a public inquiry became
untenable.
931.
By
29 January, the day after the publication of the Hutton
Report, it was clear
to Mr Blair
that President Bush intended to set up an independent US inquiry
into
pre‑conflict
intelligence before he was forced to do so by
Congress.
932.
In his ‘Note
on WMD’, sent to President Bush on 31 January, Mr Blair
concluded
that, if it
proved necessary to accept that some of the intelligence on Iraqi
WMD was
wrong, it
would be important not to “start pretending” that Iraq had nothing,
or to
allow
inaccuracies in the intelligence to distract the UK and US from
“confronting the
WMD issue”.
933.
On
2 February, the same day as President Bush confirmed the
imminent
announcement
of a “bipartisan independent commission”, Mr Blair agreed to
set up
a committee
of Privy Councillors with wider Terms of Reference than the ISC
inquiry,
looking at
“intelligence on WMD in general, not just Iraq”.
934.
Mr Straw
announced the creation of the Butler Review to Parliament on
3 February,
three days
before President Bush signed the Executive Order establishing
the
US Commission.
935.
After the
announcement of the Butler Review, the UK Government’s
focus
shifted to
the content of the next ISG report, the Status Report.
936.
The
Government, still concerned about the nature of the public debate
on
WMD in the
UK, sought to ensure that the Status Report included existing
ISG
material
highlighting the strategic intentions of Saddam Hussein’s regime
and
breaches of
Security Council resolutions.
937.
Mr Duelfer
began work on the ISG Status Report shortly after replacing Dr Kay
as
Head of the
ISG on 23 January.
938.
During his
call on Mr Blair in London on 9 February, Mr Duelfer
stated that it was
his
hypothesis that the regime’s strategy had been to outlast UN
sanctions. He did not
believe
that any judgements could be made until that was
proven.
939.
In his memoir,
Mr Duelfer recorded that, at that meeting, Mr Blair had
been “very
well
informed on the issue of WMD” and had given him the opportunity to
go into the
issue in
more depth than had been possible with President Bush or Dr Rice.
Mr Duelfer
stated that
Mr Blair had not made strong suggestions.
940.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald reported to Mr Blair on 4 March that
Mr Duelfer had made it
clear that
he would not accept “joint drafting” of his report. Sir Nigel had
asked the FCO
and SIS to
press their US counterparts and said that he and Mr Blair and
he should raise
the issue
with President Bush and Dr Rice.
608